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[BJifurcation [Entzweiung] is the source of the need for philosophy.
Hegel'

The Bankruptcy Code^ is deeply confused about the metaphysics
* Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University; Of Coun
sel, Squadron, Ellenoff, Plesent, Sheinfeld & Sorkin, N.Y., N.Y. Thanks to Larry Cunning
ham, Frank Kennedy, Randall L. Klein, Mary Josephine Newborn, Jeanne L. Schroeder, and
Jack Williams for astute comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Much of the work done on
this paper occurred while I was graciously entertained by the Georgia State University College
of Law, which elected to clepe me the Southeastern Bankruptcy Law Institute Distinguished
Visiting Professor—a position I have been honored to share with Frank Kennedy and Steve
Nickles. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Southeastern Bankruptcy Law
Institute, in Atlanta, Ga., where I benefited enormously from comments by many of the judges
and practitioners in the cases I will discuss herein.
> Georg W.F. Hegel, Differenz des Fichteschen und Schellingschen Systems der
Philosophie, in 1 HEGEL JENAER KRITISCHE SCHRIFTEN 10 (Hans Brockard & Hartmut
Buchner eds., 1979).
2 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988 & Supp. IV 1989-1992).
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of the undersecured creditor. In general, it wants to stop the clock on
creditor claims.^ Creditor claims are allowed as of the day of the
bankruptcy petition;^ they may not grow over time. Thus, postpetition interest is forbidden,' because this would admit that time exists.®
But, inconsistently, postpetition interest w allowed to oversecured
creditors—though only to the extent of the equity cushion.' Thus,
time is not abolished for oversecured creditors. Yet every oversecured
creditor is implicitly an undersecured creditor, and perhaps vice versa.
That is to say, once an equity cushion disappears, the oversecured
creditor becomes an undersecured or at least barely secured creditor.®
Therefore, if oversecured creditors live in a dynamic universe where
time exists, the time of that universe will inevitably abolish itself.
Likewise, undersecured creditors live partly in time and partly
out of time. When an undersecured party is entitled to postpetition
proceeds,® the secured claim of an undersecured creditor may grow
over time, unless the secured claim somehow is capped at the value of
the collateral at some designated time.'"
It is no accident, then, that when the Supreme Court conde
scends to pronounce some law in the field of debtor-creditor relations,
it often chooses to address the rights and status of the undersecured
creditor." On no bankruptcy subject since the Bankruptcy Code was
3 See Sexton v. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 344 (1911) (Holmes, J.) ("everything stops at a
certain date").
^ 1 1 U.S.C. § 502(b) ("thecourt... shall determine theamount ofsuch claim . . .asof the
date of the filing of the petition").
5 11 U.S.C. § 502(b)(2).
® But see 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(5) (if a debtor surplus exists after all unsecured creditors are
paid, the unsecured creditors are entitled to interest on their claims).
7 11 U.S.C. § 506(b),
To the extent that an allowed secured claim is secured by property the value of
which ... is greater than the amount of such claim, there shall be allowed to the
holder of such claim, interest on such claim, and any reasonable fees, costs, or
charges provided for under the agreement under which such claim arose.
Id.
® This is controversial. While some courts support this view, others believe that the se
cured party may insist that the equity cushion be preserved for its benefit. Still others insist
that the equity cushion may be taken away from the secured party at any time prior to the final
distribution or confirmation of the plan, even if interest has accrued against a then-existing
cushion. See David Gray Carlson, Postpetition Interest Under the Bankruptcy Code, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 577, 646-50 (1989).
S e e n U.S.C. § 552(b).
10 See David Gray Carlson, Time, Value, and the Rights of Secured Creditors in Bank
ruptcy, or. When Does Adequate Protection Begin?, 1 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 113 (1992).
11 For example, the Supreme Court has declared that a mortgagee's right to postpetition
rent must be decided by state law. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979). Ironically, it
did so in the context of upholding a decision that denied postpetition rent for failure to meet a
federal rule of procedure. See David Gray Carlson, Philosophy in Bankruptcy, 85 MICH. L.
REV. 1341, 1377-78 n.ll7 (1987). The Supreme Court also made clear that undersecured

1994]

ADEQUATE PROTECTION PAYMENTS

1359

promulgated has the Supreme Court spoken more often and with less
clarity.
Most bankruptcy practitioners would identify two Supreme
Court opinions in particular as the most mystifying. The first is
United Savings Association of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Asso
ciates, Ltd.,^^ where Justice Antonin Scalia ruled that undersecured
creditors may not obtain postpetition interest as part of their right to
adeqiiate protection of their secured claims. As a result, bankruptcy
delay reduces the value of an undersecured claim. This opinion de
nies that time exists.
The second opinion is Dewsnup v. Timm," where Justice Harry
Blackmun ruled that debtors could not freeze undersecured creditors
at the value of the collateral at some specified time. Rather, the se
cured claim must be allowed to grow. This opinion admits that time
exists and, accordingly, it draws a withering dissent from Justice
Scalia.'^
Both opinions self-consciously address the question whether a se
cured claim can grow over time—through the accrual of interest on
the claim itself or through the appreciating value of collateral. Yet a
secured claim can also shrink—a subject in which virtually no schol
arly attention has been invested. The shrinking secured claim is a
routine phenomenon in chapter 11, where bankruptcy courts often
insist that a debtor pay an undersecured creditor under the guise of its
obligation to provide "adequate protection" of a secured c l a i m . O r
judges often insist that the debtor surrender "cash collateral" that the
secured creditor already owns. What effect do these payments have
on an undersecured claim? Do they reduce the secured portion of the
claim, or the unsecured deficit? Or should they be deemed to do
parties who have repossessed collateral must nevertheless return it to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court, United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 206 n.l2 (1983) (Black
mun, J.), though it left open many questions on how far this principle extends to intangibles
and the like. See generally Craig S. Provomy, Note, The Outer Limits of Section 542 of the
Bankruptcy Code: United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., Revisited, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 935
(1986).
The Supreme Court has also decided that home mortgages held by undersecured creditors
cannot be bifurcated in chapter 13, Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank, 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993)
(Thomas, J.), even though other undersecured creditors might be bifurcated. 680 Fifth Ave.
Assocs. V. Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. {In re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 156 B.R. 726, 731-32
n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Conrad, J.) (antibifurcation rules do not apply to chapter 11
cases).
'2 484 U.S. 365, 382 (1988).
112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
Id. at 779-88 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
•5 11 U.S.C. § 363(e).
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neither—in which case they are payments of interest compensation?
These are the questions I will address in this Article.
I will proceed as follows. First, I set forth some of the basic
principles that govern undersecured creditors. Second, I consider the
legal meaning of an adequate protection payment, which I will define
as the payment of unencumbered dollars that the debtor owns free
and clear of the undersecured creditor's security interest. These pay
ments should be viewed as reducing the secured claim and the total
claim of an undersecured creditor but not the unsecured deficit claim
of that creditor. Third, I wish to describe the surrender of already
encumbered dollars as tantamount to the abandonment of collateral.
As such, these surrenders reduce the secured claim and the total
claim as well, but they do so in a way that differs from that of
adequate protection payments. When cash collateral is surrendered,
the collateral necessarily shrinks because the cash has been removed
from the collateral pool. If a court then writes down the secured
claim again, it has double-charged the secured party. In contrast, an
adequate protection payment does not reduce the pool of collateral
available, because the dollars paid are, by definition, unencumbered
dollars. These are important distinctions that are sometimes over
looked in judicial opinions.
Finally, I wish to consider the effect of cash collateral surrenders
on chapter 11 cram down. Several cases approve of setting off postconfirmation payments of cram down interest against preconfirmation
surrenders of cash collateral. I wish to identify the circumstances
under which such setoffs are permissible, and which such setoffs con
stitute an illegal invasion of the secured claim.
I.

SOME BASIC PRINCIPLES

A.

Appreciation of Collateral

The Bankruptcy Code's bicameral instinct is to take the total
claim of an undersecured creditor and divide it into two parts: one
fully secured and one fully unsecured. This is accomplished under the
authority of section 506(a), which provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property
in which the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the
extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest
in such property . . . and is an unsecured claim to the extent that
the value of such creditor's interest... is less than the amount of
such allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the
purpose of the valuation and of the proposed disposition or use of
such property, and in conjunction with any hearing on such dispo-
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sition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's interest.'®
The effect of section 506(a) can be illustrated as follows: suppose the
secured party (S!P) has a total claim of $100 and collateral worth only
$80. According to section 506(a), SP's $100 claim is subdivided into
an $80 secured claim and a $20 unsecured claim.
Once this valuation occurs, the secured party is entitled to ade
quate protection of the $80 secured claim." Adequate protection im
plies that, if the collateral depreciates in value over time, the secured
party is entitled to some form of compensation.
But what if the collateral increases in value—either through mar
ket fluctuation or investment? For example, suppose SP's collateral
increases in value from $80 to $95. Who owns the $15 in appreciation
value? This question was the matter at hand in the landmark case of
Dewsnup v. Timm}^
Until 1992, many thought that a bankruptcy trustee owned the
$15 in appreciation value. That is, SP's secured claim was forever
fixed at $80, thereby depriving SP of appreciation value and awarding
it instead to the general creditors.
This was clearly the case if a reorganization plan had been con
firmed. In chapter 11, a debtor-in-possession can cram down a
secured creditor by giving the creditor a lien "to the extent of the
allowed amount of such claims";" and securing "deferred cash pay
ment totaling at least the allowed amount of such claim, of a value, as
of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such holder's
interest in the estate's interest in such property."^® According to this
provision, SP can be crammed down for $80—^the value of the collat
eral. If, later, the collateral increases in value to $95 after confirma
tion of the plan, the gain belongs to the reorganized debtor.
Meanwhile, SP can attempt to escape this treatment by making the
section 1111(b)(2) election.^'
Before confirmation—and prior to Dewsnup v. Timm—it was less
clear that a trustee could grab the $15 appreciation value. Section
506(a) arguably implied that SP was limited to an $80 secured claim.
16 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
17 See id. § 363(e).
18 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992) (Blackmun, J.).
19 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(AXi)(I).
20 Id § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II).
21 The meaning and value of this election is famously obscure and beyond the scope of this
Article, which concentrates on preconfirmation effects on the secured claim. Suffice it to say
that the election repeals bifurcation in the chapter 11 plan. For a discussion of the § 1111(b)
election, see David Gray Carlson, Undersecured Claims Under Bankruptcy Code Sections
506(a) and lllJ(b): Second Looks at Judicial Valuations of Collateral, 6 BANKR. DEV. J. 253,
279-303 (1989).
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If the collateral increased in value to $95, the appreciation value be
came an equity cushion, which perhaps might trigger 5P's right to
postpetition interest under section 506(b).^^ But, putting aside the ac
crual of interest, such an equity cushion would belong to the trustee.
On such a view, valuations would be considered final.
A contrary interpretation of section 506(a) was possible as well.
If the valuation on which the bifurcation of an undersecured claim
was not final—if a court could constantly revisit the question and set
new values on appreciating collateral—^then SP would not be limited
to $80. Rather, the new valuation would set the secured claim at $95
and the unsecured claim at $5.^'* A reorganization plan would then be
confirmed on the basis of awarding all preconfirmation appreciation
value to SP.
Prior to 1992, section 506(d) seemed relevant to the meaning of
section 506(a). Section 506(d) mysteriously provides:
To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor
that is not an allowed secured claim, such a lien is void, unless—
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section
502(b)(5) or 502(e) of this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only
to the failure of an entity to file a proof of such claim under
section 501 of this title.^®
Continuing the hypothetical numbers employed previously, the usual
interpretation of section 506(d) was that SP's security interest for the
$80 secured claim was valid, but the security interest was "void" inso
far as the $20 unsecured claim was concerned.^® Indeed, this much
22 Attempts to use § 506(a) to separate an oversecured party from her equity cushion (and
hence a right to postpetition interest under § 506(b)) have been emphatically rejected. Abbott
Bank-Thedford v. Hanna {In re Hanna), 912 F.2d 945, 949 (8th Cir. 1990) (Magill, J.) ("In
short § 506(a) cannot be read as extinguishing an oversecured creditor's equity cushion.").
23 It is sometimes asserted that a "petition day" rule enhances the debtor's "fresh start" by
reserving postpetition appreciation for the debtor. See Donahue v. Parker {In re Donahue),
110 B.R. 41, 45 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1990) (Franklin, J.); Brace v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 33
B.R. 91, 93 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (Kerr, J.); but see Fitzgerald v. Davis {In re Fitzgerald),
729 F.2d 306, 308 (4th Cir. 1984) (^wr curiam) (low valuation on bankruptcy day should be
redone nunc pro tunc, given unexpectedly large sale price obtained later).
24 See In re Neu-Deli Corp., 19 B.R. 175, 176-77 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1982) (Caffey, J.)
(superseding earlier incorrect valuation); In re Ward, 13 B.R. 710 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981)
(Sidman, J.) (correcting a valuation mistake without comment); see also Killebrew v. Brewer
{In re Killebrew), 101 B.R. 471 (Bankr. S.D. Miss. 1988) (Gaines, J.) (abandonment revoked
because it was based upon an erroneous estimate of value by the trustee).
25 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
26 Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 889 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989) (Hutchinson, J.);
Folendore v. United States Small Business Admin. {In re Folendore), 862 F.2d 1537, 1539
(11th Cir. 1989) (Johnson, J.); Lindsey v. Federal Land Bank of St. Louis {In re Lindsey), 823
F.2d 189, 191 (7th Cir. 1987) (Posner, J.).
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could even be inferred from section 506(a) standing alone, if it is as
sumed that valuations are final and cannot be revised. That is, if the
$20 claim is indeed declared unsecured, no appreciation value accru
ing later could be applied to this unsecured $20 claim.
A line of cases refused to read section 506(d) in this manner.
These rogue cases held that only claims not allowed under section 502
may be avoided under section 506(d)." This view had been roundly
criticized for rendering section 506(d) into "mere surplusage,"" in
that we do not need section 506(d) to tell us that a lien is dead if it
secures a claim disallowed under section 502(b). As Professor Mar
garet Howard pointed out, "[t]he problem with this reading ... is the
jump from a clearly correct proposition—that a lien is void if it
secures a claim that is not allowable in bankruptcy—to the conclusion
that a lien is void only if it secures a claim that is not allowable in
bankruptcy."" Therefore, it was quite widely agreed that a court
might bifurcate an undersecured claim in a final way, such that no
further growth in the collateral would reduce the size of the secured
party's unsecured deficit claim. Yet, nevertheless, these rogue cases
took precisely Justice Blackmun's position in Dewsnup v. Timm.
Dewsnup v. Timm arose in the context of a struggle by debtors
(as opposed to trustees) to exploit section 506(d). When there is no
equity in the collateral, a trustee might abandon it to the debtor and
any surviving secured creditors.^® To revert to the previous example,
if 5i"s total claim is $100 and the collateral is worth only $80, the
trustee should abandon the collateral (unless it is useful in a reorgani
zation).^' Once the trustee has abandoned the collateral, the auto
matic stay no longer applies to restrain
Suppose SP moves to
foreclose her security interest, and, at the auction, a buyer bids $95.
Does SP take the full $95 (because her claim is $100) or only $80 (the
27 See, e.g.. In re Wolf, 58 B.R. 354, 356 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (O'Neill, J.) ("A lien
cannot be voided under Section 506, therefore, unless the claim has been disallowed under
Section 502."); Nefferdorf v. Federal Nafl Mortgage Ass'n {fn re Nefferdorf), 26 B.R. 962
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (King, J.).
28 O'Leary v. Oregon (/n re O'Leary), 75 B.R. 881, 885 (Bankr. D. Or. 1987) (Radcliffe,
J.); see also Gamett v. Farmers Home Admfn. (In re Gamett), 88 B.R. 123 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
1988) (Roberts, J.) (supporting the orthodox reading against the aberrant view), afTdsub nam.
United States v. Gamett, 99 B.R. 757 (W.D. Ky. 1989).
29 Margaret Howard, Stripping Down Liens: Section 506(d) and the Theory of Bankruptcy,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 373, 379 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
20 See 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) ("After notice and a hearing, the trustee may abandon any prop
erty of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit
to the estate.").
31 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (stay should be lifted unless either debtor equity exists or the
collateral is necessary for a successful rehabilitation).
32 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(1).
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amount of her allowed secured claim prior to the bankruptcy)? If the
latter answer is correct, the debtor emerges with $15 in post abandon
ment appreciation value.
Courts were split on this question. Many courts thought that the
debtor was entitled to the appreciation value because section 506(d)
capped SP's security interest at $80.^^ Others found various reasons
to deny the debtor any benefit from section 506(d).^^
33 The leading case following this theory is Gaglia v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 889
F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1989) (Hutchinson, J.). For a defense of this position, see Joann Hender
son, The Gaglia-Lowry Brief: A Quantum Leap from Strip Down to Chapter 7 Cram Down, 8
BANKR. DEV. J. 131 (1991); Margaret Howard, Dewsnupp/ng the Bankruptcy Code, 1 J.
BANKR. L. & PRAC. 513, 516-17 (1992).
34 There is a long line of cases that deny the debtor the power to use § 506(d) for a fresh
start. See, e.g., Larson v. Alliance Bank (Jn re Larson), 99 B.R. 1 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1989)
(Ross, J.) (collecting cases). These cases have relied upon a diverse set of reasons to deny fresh
start benefits to a debtor claiming overencumbered collateral. The arguments include: (1) it is
bad policy to encourage debtors to use chapter 7 in lieu of chapter 13; (2) benefiting the debtor
eliminates the redemption provisions in § 722 from any utility; and (3) once property is aban
doned, it is no longer part of the estate and it is too late for an avoidance power to affect that
property. Each of these rationales has weaknesses. For a discussion, see Tracey Springer,
Note, An Individual Debtor's Right to Avoid Liens Under Section 506(d) of the Bankruptcy
Code, 12 CARDOZO L. REV. 263, 269-73 (1990).
The clear (if surprising) answer should have been that neither SP nor the debtor should
have obtained the $15. This follows because SP's avoided lien of $15 was never really avoided,
in spite of the misleading language of § 506(d). Rather, it was "preserved" under Bankruptcy
Code § 551, which provides that "any lien void under section 506(d) of this title, is preserved
for the benefit of the estate but only with respect to property of the estate." 11 U.S.C.
§ 551; see In re Mammoser, 115 B.R. 758, 760 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1990) (McGuire, J.); In re
Mahaner, 34 B.R. 308, 310 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983) (Hayes, J.); Springer, supra, at 263-64.
Preservation of an avoided lien for the benefit of a bankrupt estate is a standard feature of
the trustee's avoidance powers. The basic premise is that if a trustee avoids a lien, and a
second lien creditor exists, avoidance should not provide the second lien creditor with a wind
fall promotion. Tennessee Mach. Co. v. Appalachian Energy Indus., Inc. (In re Appalachian
Energy Indus., Inc.), 25 B.R. 515 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1982) (Lundin, J.). In order to ensure
that only the general creditors benefit from lien avoidance by the trustee, § 551 of the Bank
ruptcy Code preserves the lien for the benefit of the estate, so that it can be asserted on behalf
of the estate, thereby keeping the second lien creditor in her place. See generally John C.
McCoid, II, Preservation of Avoided Transfers and Liens, 77 VA. L. REV. 1091,1101 (1991). If
§ 551 is given its effect, then the trustee obtains the appreciation value. This view received a
tentative endorsement in Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct.
773, 775 n.l (1992).
This view that the trustee retains the avoided lien when she abandons the valueless equity
also implies that, in cases where the trustee renounces all rights to the collateral, the preserved
lien is abandoned as well as the valueless equity. See H.R. REP. NO. 595,95th Cong., 1st Sess.
91 (1977) ("A preserved lien may be abandoned by the trustee under ... § 554 if the preserva
tion does not benefit the estate."). But this preserved lien is not abandoned back to the debtor.
Rather, it must be abandoned to its prior owner—the undersecured party. In our example,
SP—not the debtor—is the recipient of the avoided lien tor $15. See Mammoser, 115 B.R. at
760. Hence, as a logical matter, it would appear that a debtor could never benefit from
§ 506(d), only the trustee could. If the trustee elects to abandon the void-but-preserved lien,
the property right would revert back to the undersecured creditor who previously owned it.
See Mary Josephine Newborn, Undersecured Creditors in Bankruptcy: Dewsnup, Nobelman,
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The Supreme Court in Dewsnup v. Timm granted certiorari to
resolve the puzzle of whether a debtor could cap a secured party's
security interest at an appraised amount in bankniptcy and thereby
expropriate for herself all appreciation value. In Dewsnup, Justice
Harry Blackmun stunned the bankruptcy bar by choosing to read sec
tion 506(d) in a most unorthodox manner.'® According to Blackmun,
section 506(d) simply does not apply to undersecured claims at all.
Rather, it simply makes the point that, if the secured party's claim is
not allowed under section 502 of the Bankruptcy Code, any lien se
curing that claim is also void." This was a position that only a few
judges took; the vast weight of authority scorned this view and held
that section 506(d) did indeed apply to undersecured creditors.'®
The meaning oiDewsnup v. Timm is apparently that all apprecia
tion growth in the collateral belongs to the secured party—^at least
imtil the collateral is sold or a plan is confirmed." Or, to say the
same thing in different words, Dewsnup v. Timm requires that bifurca
tions of undersecured claims are never final.
B.

Proceeds

Another way secured claims can grow over time is by the accrual
of proceeds, in cases where the underlying collateral retains its origi
nal value. According to Bankruptcy Code section 552,
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, prop
erty acquired by the estate or by the debtor after the commence
ment of the case is not subject to any lien resulting from any
security agreement entered into by the debtor before the com
mencement of the case.
(b) Except as provided in sections 363, 506(c), 522, 544, 545,
547, and 548 of this title, if the debtor and an entity entered into a
security agreement before the commencement of the case and if the
and the Decline of Priority, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 547, 592 (1993) (suggesting statutory revision to
reinstate this result).
35 112 S. Ct. 773, 776 (1992) (Blackmun, J.).
36 See 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (/n re 680 Fifth Ave. Assocs.), 156
B.R. 726, 732 n.7 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993) (Conrad, J.) (contrary to "arguably plain meaning"
of Bankruptcy Code); Zablonski v. Sears Mortgage Corp. (/« re Zablonski), 153 B.R. 604, 606
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1993) (Queenan, J.) ("a striking example of subjugation of statutory lan
guage to policy considerations"); Craig H. Averch et al.. The Right of Oversecured Creditors to
Default Rates of Interest from a Debtor in Bankruptcy, 47 Bus. LAW. 961, 973 (1992) ("turned
the statutory interpretation of the Bankruptcy C^e on its head"); Howard, supra note 33, at
516-17 ("astonishing, novel, and directly contradicted by the legislative history"); Newborn,
supra note 34, at 592 ("the Court's reasoning for its atavism is particularly unpersuasive").
37 Dewsnup, 112 S. a. at 778.
38 See supra text accompanying notes 27-29.
39 Newborn, supra note 34, at 583.
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security interest created by such security agreement extends to
property of the debtor acquired before the commencement of the
case and to proceeds, product, oflFspring, rents, or profits of such
property, then such security interest extends to such proceeds,
product, oflFspring, rents, or profits acquired by the estate after the
commencement of the case to the extent provided by such security
agreement and by applicable non-bankruptcy law, except to any
extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on the
equities of the case, orders otherwise.'"'
Where a security interest in inventory exists, the right to proceeds
under section 552(b) does not necessarily increase the size of the se
cured claim, because, for every dollar of postpetition proceeds ob
tained, the secured creditor gives up an item of inventory.^' But in a
real estate case, where the mortgagee has a valid security interest in
rents, the secured claim routinely grows in size, so long as the build
ing is properly maintained. Indeed, the value of the building is noth
ing but the present value of future rental income. As time passes and
cash collateral accrues, the secured creditor will own not only the
original building but the accumulating rents as well.
Dewsnup v. Timm was important for secured creditors whose
cash collateral constituted an improvement in position over time.
Prior to Dewsnup, when section 506(d) was thought to disencumber
the unsecured deficit portion of the undersecured claim, it was open
for trustees to argue that, following bifurcation, the unsecured claim
was completely independent from and indiflferent to the accrual of ad
ditional cash collateral.'*^ To be sure, the secured creditor would still
own postpetition proceeds of prepetition collateral. These proceeds,
however, could not be applied against the separate unsecured claim of
the undersecured creditor. Rather, they would form an equity cush
ion for the secured portion of the tot^ claim. This equity cushion
would have allowed the undersecured creditor to obtain postpetition
interest and collection expenses under section 506(b)—provided the
trustee abstained from spending the debtor equity so that interest
11 U.S.C. § 552.
Inventory sold in the ordinary course of business is free and clear of security interests
created by the debtor. U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (1992). The trustee exploits this power to sell free
and clear under 11 U.S.C. § 363(0(1) ("The trustee may sell. . . free and clear of any interest
. . . only if (1) applicable nonbankruptcy law permits sale of such property free and clear of
such interest . . . .").
42 For cases following this theory, see In re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership, 119
B.R. 809 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990) (McFeeley, J.); DeFranco v. Ralph D. Kaiser Co. {In re
DeFranco), 93 B.R. 307 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988) (Teel, J.).
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could accrue against it.^^
Thanks to Dewsnup v. Timm, however, it is probably impossible
to argue that bifurcations are final. As a result, accruing cash collat
eral cannot count as pure equity cushion. Rather, it must instead
secure the previously unsecured deficit. Or, to say the same thing
in different words, accruing cash collateral means that the unsecured
portion of the total claim is shrinking and the secured portion is grow
ing. This effect necessarily implies that the undersecured creditor
is not receiving interest compensation from the accruing cash
collateral.^
There is one remaining theory, however, whereby a debtor-inpossession might still deprive a secured creditor of the accrual of cash
collateral. Section 552(b) may guarantee postpetition proceeds to the
undersecured creditor, but that subsection also provides an exception:
"to any extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and based on
the equities of the case, orders otherwise."^' It is therefore open for a
debtor-in-possession to argue that any improvement of position over
time is inequitable. This even gets some support from the legislative
history, which states: "The provision allows the court to consider the
equities in each case. In the course of such consideration, the court
may evaluate any expenditures by the estate relating to proceeds and
any related improvement in position of the secured party."^^ This
remark does not quite say that improvements in position are inequita
ble. Rather, it says that improvements related to expenditures by the
trustee are inequitable. Nevertheless, the debtor-in-possession always
makes some expenditures to assure that postpetition cash flows are
maintained. Therefore, it is not impossible that a court could use this
remark to justify disencumbering an income stream from a security
interest, to the extent that it allows the secured creditor to improve
her position over time."^^ But it will be a brave judge indeed who does
••3 See infra text accompanying notes 101-02 for a discussion of whether a trustee has the
duty to preserve debtor equity in anticipation that interest will accrue in the future.
** In re Bloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. 93, 96-97 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993) (Barliant, J.).
Once the unsecured deficit disappears through accrual of rent, an equity cushion then emerges
late in the petition and, with it, a sudden right to postpetition interest. See infra text accompa
nying notes 101-02.
« 11 U.S.C. § 552(b).
^ 124 CONG. REC. 32,400 (1978).
According to Judge Donal D. Sullivan: "The purpose behind the 'equities of the case'
rule ... is, in a proper case, to enable those who contribute to the production of proceeds
during chapter 11 to share jointly with pre-petition creditors secured by proceeds." United
States V. Van Vactor, Francis & Martin {In re Crouch), 51 B.R. 331, 332 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985).
In applying this aphorism. Judge Arthur Spector has opined that the secured party is entitled
to only the percentage of cash proceeds that represents the contribution of collateral to the
production of the proceeds. In re Delbridge, 61 B.R. 484, 490-91 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1986).
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this in the teeth of Dewsnup v. Timm, which is premised on the moral
principle that undersecur^ creditors deserve any appreciation value
in the collateral.^®
C.

Undersecured Creditors and Interest Compensation

Bankruptcy Code section 506(b) gives oversecured creditors a
right to postpetition interest—^but only to the extent of the equity
What the secured party contributes, according to Spector, is the depreciation of the existing
collateral. Id. at 491. What the debtor-in-possession contributes is maintenance expense of
the capital, plus labor needed to bring the proceeds into existence.
In Delbridge, the collateral was cows, and the proceeds were milk produced, which milk
was sold to a dairy cooperative. At stake was ownership of the checks issued by the coopera
tive in exchange for the milk. Spector suggested the following formula:
CC =

DP
D -I- E -I- L

where CC = cash collateral, D = average depreciation per cow, E = average direct expenses
maintaining the cow, L = average labor per cow, and P = average cash proceeds per cow. Id.
at 490. Judge Spector describes this formula as follows:
The lender is entitled to the same percentage of the proceeds of the post-petition
milk as its capital contribution to the production of the milk bears to the total of
the capital and direct operating expenses incurred in producing the milk. Because
the parties are in a direct mathematical relationship, the rule should be easy to
apply. Very simply, the larger is the lender's capital contribution to the venture,
the larger its share of the proceeds ought to be. Conversely, if the farmer's input in
the venture is great, the "equities of the case" compel that his share of the proceeds
likewise be great.
Id. at 491 (citing In re Crouch, 51 B.R. 331, 332 (Bankr. D. Or. 1985)).
At least one problem with this formula is that the secured party is independently entitled
to adequate protection for any depreciation {D) that eats into the secured claim itself. If the
secured party receives adequate protection for this depreciation, then the secured party is con
tributing nothing to the cash flow. On Spector's formula, the secured party therefore receives
zero proceeds. On the other hand, if proceeds are conceived as a replacement of adequate
protection, it should be recognized that the ratio of D over a numerator larger than D guaran
tees that the secured party never recovers D out of the proceeds (P). Therefore, Spector's
formula effectively denies or at least reduces the secured party's right to adequate protection.
Also, if the above formula is applied in light of an equity cushion, then D can again be
said to equal zero, because depreciation does not harm the secured party so long as an equity
cushion is present. Such a conclusion means that the secured party's share of postpetition
proceeds is always zero. Judge Spector, however, applied his formula to a case involving a
debtor equity, and found that D had a positive value, thereby winning for the secured party a
20% share of the cash proceeds. Id. at 492.
Finally, in some cases, as in a typical real estate case, the collateral never depreciates, even
as cash collateral accrues. When a building is well maintained and the real estate market is
stable, the secured party will obtain zero rent, according to Judge Spector's formula.
Therefore, Judge Spector's formula is highly corrosive to the secured party's rights under
Bankruptcy Code § 552(b).
48 Newborn, supra note 34, at 597 ("[T]he majority's only tenable position in Dewsnup and
Nobelman is based on the notion that lien avoidance deprives the undersecured creditor of its
pre-bankruptcy bargain.").
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cushion the secured creditor enjoys.^' Undersecured creditors are
conspicuously left out.
In the 1980s, the theory developed that an undersecured creditor
deserved postpetition interest after all—as part of her right to ade
quate protection. The theory was that a secured claim drawing no
interest is worth less than a secured claim that does. For example, if
SP claims $100 and the collateral is worth only $80, SP is entitled to
be protected for $80, and this can only occur if SP obtains interest
compensation. Suppose that the parties expect a bankruptcy proceed
ing to take a year before dividends are distributed, and the market
rate of interest is 10%. If SP is otherwise protected for $80 but ob
tains no interest compensation for a year, then the value ofSP's claim
immediately falls to $72.72.'° SP is therefore underprotected.
The argument that undersecured creditors deserve interest com
pensation was a severe threat to chapter 11. Many debtors-in-possession could not have provided adequate protection to undersecured
creditors if that concept included interest compensation. It was there
fore a matter of great relief to the debtor's bar that this threat was
eliminated by the Supreme Court in United Savings Association of
Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates, Ltd?^ Today, under
secured creditors are not supposed to obtain postpetition interest.
Yet many ambiguities remain. For example, ancient law under
the Bankruptcy Act always held that undersecured creditors could
obtain postpetition interest when they also claimed the postpetition
income stream produced by the collateral.'^ Dewsnup v. Timm en
dorses the interpretive idea that any pre-Code practice not specifically
denounced in the legislative history or negated by the exact words of
the Bankruptcy Code is presumed to be ratified by Congress." There
fore, it is still possible that undersecured creditors obtain postpetition
interest whenever their collateral is growing. And, by implication, if
what they receive is postpetition interest, it should also be true that
(a) accruing collateral does not secure the previously unsecured defi
es 11 U.S.C. § 506(b).

50 This number is calculated by dividing $80 by 1.1, to reflect a 10% disccunt rate.
" 484 U.S. 365 (1988). For a critical analysis of Justice Scalia's "holistic" reading of the
Bankruptcy Code, see Carlson, supra note 8, at 601-10.
52 Sexton V. Dreyfus, 219 U.S. 339, 346 (1911) (Holmes, J.).
53 Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 779 (1992) ("[T]his Court has been reluctant to
accept arguments that would interpret the Code, however vague the particular language under
consideration might be, to effect a major change in pre-Code practice that is not the subject of
at least some discussion in the legislative history."). Ironically, Professor Mary Josephine
Newborn demonstrates that Congress did indeed intend to change pre-Code practice in the
treatment of undersecured creditors and that Congress indicated such intention in the legisla
tive history. Newborn, supra note 34, at 51i-76.
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cit, (b) bifurcations are therefore final as soon as made, and (c) the
secured party is entitled only to postpetition interest (presumably on
the entire prepetition claim), and the bankruptcy trustee may have the
rest. In this sense, Dewsnup is self-contradictory.
Whether cash collateral should be allocated to postpetition inter
est or to the unsecured deficit was raised in the Timbers case itself,
and it would pay us to consider the exact procedural and financial
posture of that case. In its earlier incarnation as Republic Bank Hous
ton V. Bear Creek Ministorage, Inc. (In re Bear Creek Ministorage,
Inc.),^* the mortgagee had a security interest on rents. Judge Wesley
Steen had approved a cash collateral order that gave the secured party
net rents—rents left over after maintenance expenses of the collateral
were covered.^' Additionally, the secured party moved to lift the au
tomatic stay pursuant to section 362(d)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code
because the secured party was not receiving adequate protection for
its remaining secured claim.'® To be more precise, the secured party
insisted that adequate protection of the secured claim meant a right to
postpetition interest on its secured claim. Since the secured party was
taking away the accruing net rents, the secured claim was not grow
ing.'' Therefore, the secured party wanted interest on this relatively
stable secured claim.
Judge Steen ruled that adequate protection included the right to
postpetition interest—a holding the Supreme Court would eventually
reverse in Timbers—^but, in response to this holding, the debtor in
sisted that the net rents the secured party was actually receiving be
credited against the secured party's apparent right to receive postpeti
tion interest as part of adequate protection.'®
Judge Steen was clearly skeptical of this claim. He pointed out
that the rents were themselves collateral to secure the undersecured
claim and implied that adequate protection payments had to be from
unencumbered dollars. Nevertheless, he evaded the issue and refused
to rule on whether the cash collateral could be credited against
49 B.R. 454 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1985), rev'd and remanded sub nam. United Sav. Ass'n of
Tex. V. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd. {In re Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1387 (5th Cir. 1986), ajfW en banc, 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd,
484 U.S. 365 (1988).
5' Presumably, cash collateral could be used to cover maintenance expenses under the au
thority of § 506(c) and also § 552(b)'s equity exception. See David Gray Carlson, Secured
Creditors and Expenses of Bankruptcy Administration, 70 N.C. L. REV. 417, 439-40, 484-90
(1992).
Bear Creek Ministorage, 49 B.R. at 456.
Possibly the collateral was appreciating because the market for real estate was improv
ing, id., but this is different from growth stemming from the accrual of rents.
58 Id. at 460.
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postpetition interest obligations.'®
Yet, in spite of this sidestep, the question remains—what was the
meaning of those rents that the secured party in Bear Creek Ministorage was receiving? If the secured party's total claim was reduced
one dollar for every net rent dollar received, then the net rents did not
constitute postpetition interest. On the other hand, if the total claim
of the undersecured party was unaffected, then these net rents did
constitute postpetition interest payments.
On appeal. Justice Scalia was not perfectly clear on his view of
the meaning of accruing cash collateral. One of his arguments against
postpetition interest is that it too closely resembles rent:
Section 552(b) .. . makes possession of a perfected security interest
in postpetition rents or profits from collateral a condition of having
them applied to satisfying the claim of the secured creditor ahead
of the claims of unsecured creditors. Under petitioner's interpreta
tion, however, the undersecured creditor who lacks such a per
fected security interest in effect achieves the same result by
demanding the "use value" of his collateral under § 362.®'
This statement indicates that secured parties can improve their posi
tion through rent, but it does not really indicate whether the secured
claim remains frozen and the new cash collateral creates an equity
cushion for the secured claim, or whether the rent increases the se
cured claim and decreases the unsecured claim.
Nevertheless, we will assume that the meaning of Timbers—
least when read contrapuntally with Dewsnup^ v. Timm is that an
undersecured creditor cannot have any postpetition interest. Any im
provement of position goes to reduce the unsecured deficit claim and,
simultaneously, to increase the secured claim. Only after so much
cash collateral accrues that the unsecured deficit has disappeared may
the secured creditor claim postpetition interest under section 506(b).
D.

Summary

These are the principles we need to fathom the main question of
this Article—what is the effect of postpetition payments to under
secured creditors? The operative principles are that (1) bifurcation of
the undersecured claim into its component parts is never final before
sale of the collateral, confirmation of the plan, or distribution of liqui
dation proceeds, (2) pending bifurcation, the undersecured creditor is
entitled to all growth in the collateral, whether it results from pure
60 United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 374
(1988).
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market improvement or the accrual of postpetition cash proceeds
from the prepetition collateral, and (3) the undersecured creditor is
not entitl^ to postpetition interest. Together these principles imply
that growth of collateral must render the unsecured deficit smaller
and the allowed secured claim larger as time passes.
II.

ADEQUATE PROTECTION PAYMENTS

If depreciation infects the collateral of the secured creditor,
Bankruptcy Code section 361 suggests, inter alia, that the secured
creditor be awarded cash in compensation.®' Let us reserve the term
"adequate protection payment" to mean the payment of unencum
bered dollars to the secured creditor to counteract the eflFect of depre
ciation. Under this definition, surrender of cash collateral is strictly
distinguished as something else entirely. A secured creditor already
owns the cash collateral, but obtains title to adequate protection pay
ments only at the time the payment is made.
What ought to be the meaning of these adequate protection pay
ments, as we have narrowly defined them? Suppose a secured creditor
is undersecured, so that bifurcation is necessary under Bankruptcy
Code section 506(a). The undersecured creditor now owns two en
tirely separate claims—one secured and one unsecured. The two to
gether constitute the total allowed claim of this creditor.
Adequate protection payments should reduce the secured claim
and the total claim as well.®^ The unsecured deficit claim, however,
should be unaffected by the adequate protection payments, so long as
any part of the secured claim remains outstanding. Once the secured
claim is extinguished, the adequate protection payments ought to
cease. The debtor-in-possession may be authorized to protect secured
claims, but is not authorized to pay unsecured creditors prior to the
confirmation of a plan or prior to a chapter 7 distribution.
For example, suppose an undersecured creditor, after a section
506(a) valuation, has a $100 claim subdivided into an $80 secured
According to § 361(1), adequate protection may be provided by
requiring the trustee to make a cash payment or periodic cash payments to [the
secured creditor], to the extent that the stay under section 362 of this title, use,
sale, or lease under section 363 of this title, or any grant of a lien under section 364
of this title results in a decrease in the value of such entity's interest in such
property.
11 U.S.C. § 361(1).
« In re Seip, 116 B.R. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (Minahan, J.) (determining that
adequate protection payments reduce an oversecured party's claim).
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claim and a $20 unsecured claim," and suppose that the secured cred
itor receives an $8 adequate protection payment pursuant to section
361(1). After the payment, the secured creditor would have a $20
unsecured claim—the same as before—^and only a $72 secured claim.
The adequate protection payments, then, should reduce the secured
claim as well as the total claim." This is shown in Figure One.
$100

$80

Unsecured Deficit

Payment

/

Paymoit'

$100
$92
$80
$72

Secured Claim

Bankiuptcy Petition

Time

Plan Contiimed

FIGURE ONE: ADEQUATE PROTECTION PAYMENT PROPERLY APPLIED

If, contrary to these principles, these payments are applied
against the unsecured deficit claim of the secured creditor (without

reducing the secured claim), then the secured creditor is getting a bo
nus—a secured claim according to the original valuation plus an addi
tional payment on top of that. Thus, a secured creditor whose
unsecured deficit was reduced from $20 to $12 but who still had the
right to $80 in collateral is getting too much. Of course, if the collat
eral has depreciated, the above example presumes that the trustee has
been obliged to find substitute collateral to supplement the collateral,
so that the secured claim still equals $80.®' This is shown in Figure
Two.
If these numbers seem trivial in size, the reader is invited to imagine as many pendant
zeroes as necessary to make the discussion more interesting.
64 Accord In re Spacek, 112 B.R. 162 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Monroe, J.) (holding that
the adequate protection payments made while the case was pending must be applied against
the secured portion of indebtedness).
65 Thus, § 361(2) provides that adequate protection may be achieved by "providing to [the
secured creditor] an additional or replacement lien," in case of depreciation or other depreda
tion. 11 U.S.C. § 361(2).
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Plan Confirmed

FIGURE TWO: ADEQUATE PROTECTION PAYMENT IMPROPERLY APPLIED

Such a holding constitutes double compensation for the deprecia
tion. First, the secured creditor receives cash. Second, the secured
creditor receives additional collateral to cover the depreciation. The
secured creditor should have one or the other, but not both, of these
modes of adequate protection.
The proper allocation of an adequate protection payment to the
secured claim (and total claim) but not to the unsecured claim should
be compared to voidable preference doctrine, where precisely the op
posite ^locations are made. When an undersecured creditor obtains
unencumbered prepetition dollars from the debtor, courts will assume
that these dollars have reduced the unsecured deficit claim. This allo
cation assures that the payment allows the secured creditor to receive
more from the payment than it would have received from a hypotheti
cal liquidation of the bankrupt estate—one of the classic elements of a
voidable preference.^® If the dollars had been allocated to the secured
portion of the claim, then this element cannot be met, because the
dollars received before bankruptcy reduce dollar for dollar the bank
ruptcy dividend the undersecured creditor would receive in the hypo
thetical liquidation.®'
66 According to § 547(b)(5), the trustee may avoid a preference only if it
enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if—
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the
provisions of this title.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(5).
Early in the life of the Bankruptcy Code, a secured party tried to argue as follows: an
undersecured creditor, by definition, has not one but two claims—one that is perfectly secured
and one that is perfectly unsecured. When the debtor pays the secured party with unencum
bered dollars, it is open to the secured party to allocate the payment to the secured claim. If
this assumption is adopted, the secured party does not run afoul of the hypothetical liquidation
test. This argument was disallowed in Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.
1981). There, Judge William J. Jameson ruled that the payment of unencumbered dollars to
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The difference between the allocation of adequate protection pay
ments and the allocation of prepetition payments is that, prior to the
petition, only one single undersecured claim exists. When the debtor
pays this claim in part, the payment reduces the total claim but leaves
the collateral intact. A debtor cannot force the secured creditor to
apply the unencumbered dollars to reduce the amount of collateral
available. After the petition, the undersecured claim becomes two en
tirely separate and divorced claims.^® Of these, only the secured claim
is entitled to adequate protection. Accordingly, the adequate protec
tion payments reduce the secured claim, not the unsecured deficit.
A. Cash Payments in Light of an Equity Cushion
Even though the continued existence of an equity cushion is not
even mentioned as a mode of adequate protection in section 361, it is
probably the most popular form of it. Some courts have suggested
that when debtor equity exists, a court must not also award cash pay
ments for depreciation as a means of adequate protection.®' That is,
debtor equity as a mode of adequate protection preempts cash pay
ments or perhaps any other form of adequate protection mentioned in
section 361.
the secured party must first be allocated to the unsecured deficit. Id. at 511. On this assump
tion, an undersecured party has always received a voidable preference if the debtor is insolvent,
because the hypothetical liquidation test always condemns the payment. The reason Judge
Jameson insisted on this assumption is that it conforms to the natural assumption any under
secured party would have made prior to the bankruptcy petition. No undersecured creditor
willingly gives up collateral if she does not have to. Therefore, the undersecured party could
not, through revisionist history, redescribe its belief of the significance of the prepetition pay
ment.
The Barash decision, however, seems based on the probable intent of the secured party
prior to bankruptcy. If so, it remains open for a secured party to make a record that, indeed,
just before bankruptcy, the secured party did intend to release collateral in exchange for pay
ment. When this occurs, the hypothetical liquidation test cannot be met. Craig H. Averch &
Michael J. Collins, Avoidance
Foreclosure Sales as Preferential Transfers: Another Serious
Threat to Secured Creditors?, 24 TEX. TECH L. REV. 985, 1004 (1993). Furthermore, a release
of collateral constitutes "new value," as that word is defined in § 547(a)(2). Hence, a release of
value in cTrhanEf; for payment would constitute a contemporaneous exchange of value, not a
transfer on antecedent debt at all. This constitutes a second reason why such a transaction is
not a voidable preference. But these ideas depend upon the intent of an undersecured party
prior to bankruptcy to release collateral, something most undersecured creditors are loathe to
do. Vem Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L.
REV. 713, 744 (1985).
68 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
6' Slee, e.g.. In re Senior Care Props., Inc., 137 B.R. 527, 529 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. 1992)
(Killian, J.); Confederation Life Ins. Co. v. Beau Rivage Ltd., 126 B.R. 632, 639 (N.D. Ga.
1991) (Ward, J.); In re Laymon, 117 B.R. 856, 865 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.), rev'd
on other grounds, 958 F.2d 72 (5th dr.), cert denied sub nom. Crozier v. Bradford, 113 S. Ct.
328 (1992).
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A rule against cash payments whenever debtor equity exists is
useful in one regard. If principal is paid down, or if extra collateral is
contributed, the equity cushion increases and, with it, the secured
party's entitlement to postpetition interest under section 506(b). This
development would violate the premise, now endorsed by the
Supreme Court,™ that the equity cushion is the maximum amount of
postpetition interest a secured party can have. From this it follows
that any attempt to create or expand the cushion through adequate
protection payments or the like should not be permitted to enrich the
secured party in the guise of increased postpetition interest.''
A similar concern arises if the court authorizes current payment
of postpetition interest under section 506(b). If the interest is paid
currently, it fails to accrue against the equity cushion. If interest
compensation is allowed to extend beyond the equity cushion, then
the bankruptcy court has violated the premise that the equity cushion
is the limit of the postpetition interest entitlement.™
Some courts allow for payments in the face of an equity cush
ion.'^ In RCA Corp: v. Video East, Inc. (In re Video East, Inc.)^^ the
debtor alleged that the collateral was not deteriorating in value. Nev
ertheless, because the secured party had received no payment under
the security agreement in twenty-four months, the automatic stay was
lifted." Significantly, Judge Emil Goldhaber emphasized that pay
ments under the security agreement must be made." These pay
ments, of course, are not precisely the same as adequate protection
payments, which should arguably match the amount of depreciation
'0 United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 372
(1988) (Scalia, J.) ("[§ 506(a)] permits postpetition interest to be paid only out of the 'security
cushion*").
•'t To the extent the secured party received cash in Laymon, Judge Clark ordered that the
payments be recharacterized as payment of postpetition interest. Laymon, 117 B.R. at 865.
This would not entirely solve the problem of the expanding cushion. If interest is paid in cash,
then the cushion is preserved so that postpetition interest can continue to be collected indefi
nitely. Even under Judge Clark's rule, a means is needed to prevent the secured party from
getting interest beyond the amount implied in the equity cushion at the start of the bankruptcy
proceeding. For the suggestion that the trustee should buy increments of the secured claim
and never pay the interest oligation, see David Gray Carlson, Oversecured Creditors Under
Bankruptcy Code Section 506(b): The Limits of Postpetition Interest, Attorneys' Fees, and Col
lection Expenses, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 381, 397-407 (1990).
'2 See Carlson, supra note 71, at 389-94.
Eg., Grundy Nat'l Bank v. Frank (In re Frank), 103 B.R. 771, 774-75 (W.D. Va. 1989)
(Williams, J.) (upholding adequate protection order that permitted the complete retirement of
the secured claim, thereby obviously outstripping depreciation—and allowing the payment of
interest to an undersecured creditor to boot).
74 41 B.R. 176 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
75 Id. at 181-82.
76 Id.
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expense. And, in his opinion, Goldhaber expressly stated that he was
not lifting the automatic stay for lack of adequate protection, but
rather for "cause."" Hence, it appears that Goldhaber viewed his
ruling as not One pertaining to classic adequate protection.'® Rather,
he simply required that secured parties be paid, from time to time.
III.

CASH COLLATERAL COMPARED

Adequate protection payments entail the transfer of unencum
bered dollars and must always be distinguished from the surrender of
cash collateral. Cash collateral already belongs to the secured party.
Properly viewed, payment of encumbered dollars is tantamount to
abandonment of overencumbered collateral. If a bankruptcy court
treats cash collateral as an adequate protection payment, it has ruth
lessly disencumbered it and has avoided a perfected security interest.
Suppose a trustee proposes to compensate a secured party for
depreciation by paying over cash collateral. The surrender of cash
collateral, by definition, reduces the secured claim, just as abandon
ment of any collateral would. Meanwhile, the secured party remains
entirely uncompensated for any depreciation, unless something else is
done. In our example, suppose that, of the $80 in collateral, $65 is
illiquid collateral that is depreciating, and $15 is cash collateral. The
total claim is $100. The bankruptcy court determines that the illiquid
collateral is expected to depreciate by $15, and, in attempting to pro
tect the secured party, requires the surrender of the $15 in cash collat
eral. In fact, the secured party is not protected at all. The original
collateral of $80 reduces itself to $65 when the cash collateral is sur
rendered and, on top of that, the $65 in illiquid collateral depreciates
to $50. At the time a plan is confirmed, the secured party has an
unsecured deficit claim of $35 and only $50 of illiquid collateral.
Such a secured party has not been adequately protected. This is
shown in Figure Three.
77 Id.
78 There are many such rulings out of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. See Royal
Bank of Pa. v. Three Tuns, Inc. (In re Three Tuns, Inc.), 35 B.R. 110, 111 n.2 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. 1983) (Goldhaber, J.) (citing cases).
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FIGURE THREE: SURRENDER OF CASH COLLATERAL MISAPPLIED

On the other hand, if a trustee gives over cash collateral and re
places that cash collateral with additional substitute collateral, the se
cured claim is now being protected. The additional collateral might
compensate for depreciation, while surrender of the cash collateral
serves to reduce the total claim of the creditor. For example, suppose
a secured party claims a $65 illiquid asset and $15 in cash collateral.
Depreciation of the illiquid asset is expected, so that the bankruptcy
court orders the debtor to give $15 in extra collateral, resulting in a
total secured claim of $95 (up from $80). The debtor also surrenders
the cash collateral of $15, reducing the secured claim back to $80.
The expected depreciation occurs, so that, at the time a plan is con
firmed, the collateral is worth only $65. Of this, $15 represents the
new collateral, and $50 represents the worth of the old depreciated
illiquid asset. The secured party has been adequately protected, be
cause the total claim was reduced from $100 to $85 (when the secured
party received cash collateral). The unsecured deficit has remained
constant at $20. This scheme is shown in Figure Four.
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FIGURE FOUR: SURRENDER OF CASH COLLATERAL PROPERLY APPLIED
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Increasing Cash Collateral

Slightly more confusing are the cases in which collateral is not
depreciating, but cash proceeds are accumulating. Here we have a
paradox. On the one hand, an income-producing asset is valued on
the basis of future income. On the other hand, as time passes, the
amount of collateral increases. For example, an asset may earn $8 a
year. On the basis of this income going forward, the present value of
the asset is deemed to be $80. One year later, the asset, having suf
fered no depreciation, is still worth $80—^based on income going for
ward. Yet $8 of income has accumulated so that total collateral is
now $88.
A valuation implies that the right to collect income is subsumed
into the collateral itself. In In re Landing Associates. Ltd.a debtor
tried to exploit this economic factor by using it to argue that, onceincome-producing property is valued, income is disencumbered from
an undersecured party's perfected security interest in the income. On
this view, accrued income never belongs to the secured property;
rather, the secured party has only the collateral, which always repre
sents future income. Judge Leif Clark properly rejected this at
tempted introduction of a new avoidance power. Instead, Judge
Clark contemplated that the undersecured party should become in
creasingly secured as new rental income accrued. This was justified
because Clark specifically rejected the petition date as the relevant
valuation rule. Rather, he chose to value the collateral as of the time
the reorganization plan was confirmed.®"
If, instead of accumulating income, the bankruptcy court orders
that the income be surrendered, the secured claim is reduced—from
$88 back to $80. Now these payments cannot be payments of postpetition interest (thanks to at least one reading of Timbers). The pay
ments must instead be payment on the total claim (which is reduced
to $92). The payments also reduce the secured claim (provided that it
is strictly understood that the secured claim had grown to $88 and is
now being pared back to $80).®'
One case that conforms to this model is In re Flagler-at-First As
sociates, Ltd. ,®^ an opinion that is conceptually sound, though perhaps
not a monument to expressive clarity. In Flagler, the debtor surren
dered cash collateral to an undersecured party. Judge Jay Cristol
'9 122 B.R. 288, 291 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1990) (Clark, J.).
80 Id. at 292-93.
81 See generally Grant T. Stein, Options for Handling Adequate Protection Payments for
Rents, 1991 FAULKNER & GRAY'S BANKR. L. REV. 18, 18.
82 114 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cristol, J.).
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ruled that these surrenders should not reduce the secured claim, but
what he meant was (using the above numbers) the secured claim was
reduced from $88 back to $80. Cristol thought the collateral had
been "declining in value,but the decline in question was precisely
the surrender of the $8. In Cristol's view, the surrender of the $8 to
the secured party was simply a form of depreciation, along the lines of
rusty pipes or cracking foundations.®* While a confusing way of put
ting it. Judge Cristol was nevertheless correct in his result.®'
Simultaneously, it should also be true that the total claim of the
undersecured party was reduced (from $100 to $92), and the un
secured deficit claim remains where it would have been if the cash
collateral simply accumulated in the bankrupt estate. This additional
consequence is at least not inconsistent with Judge Cristol's opinion.®^
Meanwhile, what the debtor wanted va. Flagler was to reduce the
secured claim from $80 (where it stood at the beginning of the pro
ceeding) to $72. Judge Cristol saw this for what it was—an avoidance
of the security interest in the cash flow, so that cash actually surren83 Id. at 297.
Judge Cristol states:
The post-petition payments made by Flagler were not intended to protect [the se
cured party's] interest in any noncash collateral. The post-petition payments only
afforded [adequate] protection against the erosion of [the secured party's] secured
claim with respect to [the secured party's] interest in the cash collateral derived
from the Building.
Id. at 301. The meaning of this seems to be that the secured party may have received money,
but it also lost the cash collateral by virtue of receiving the money. That is, using the sample
numbers supplied in the text, accumulating cash collateral drives the secured claim up to $88
and the surrender of these proceeds brings it back down to $80.
85 See also In re Continental Airlines, Inc., 134 B.R. 536, 543-44 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991)
(Balick, J.) (interest accruing on cash collateral to be applied toward the unsecured portion of
the undersecured creditor's claim); Mitchell v. Frankford Trust Co. {In re Mitchell), 75 B.R.
593, 597 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1987) (Scholl, J.) (refusing to reduce allowed secured claim by the
amount of surrendered cash collateral in the form of insurance proceeds).
86 Judge Cristol remarks;
In its reply memorandum Flagler asks a somewhat misleading, but otherwise
valid, question: "If the Building and its rent are intended to collateralize [the se
cured party's] secured claim, isn't it the case that such payments from the collat
eral are intended to repay either interest on such claim, or reduce the principal
balance of such claim? . . . [T]he answer to the question is yes, the post-petition
payments are to be applied to principal, afier taking into account that [the secured
party's] secured claim includes the excess rents generated and paid to [the secured
party] during the Chapter 11.
Flagler, 114 B.R. at 301-02. Judge Joyce Bihary reads Flagler as meaning that the unsecured
deficit is reduced. In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440, 450 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991). But
just in case, she also remarked, "while the courts have politely discussed Flagler and have
attempted to distinguish it, it is difficult to understand or apply and it has not been generally
followed." Id. at 451 (citing/n re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd Partnership, 119 B.R. 809, 813
(Bankr. D.N.M. 1990) (McFeeley, J.)).
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dered was unencumbered cash. If unencumbered cash had been
paid—a genuine adequate protection payment—and if no security in
terest in the cash flow existed, the secured claim would indeed be re
duced from a static $80 to $72. This, Judge Cristol noted, would
violate the secured party's rights to proceeds under section 552(b).®'
B.

Pop-Up Equity Cushions

Cash collateral surrendered to the secured party should reduce
the total claim and also prevent (to the extent of the surrender) the
growth of the secured claim. On the hypothetical numbers illustrated
in Figure Four, when $8 in cash collateral is surrendered, the total
claim shrinks to $92 and the secured claim stays at $80; that is, it fails
to grow to $88. It should follow that, if more time passes, the un
secured deficit of $12 will entirely disappear as more and more cash
collateral is surrendered. This occurred in several cases in which a
debtor wished to cram down an undersecured party with a large un
secured deficit claim at the start of the reorganization proceeding.®®
The disappearance of the unsecured deficit claim is a happy event
for a debtor wishing to cram down a plan in a single asset case. Typi
cally, if any unsecured deficit exists in a single asset case, it is so large
relative to other unsecured claims that the dominant secured creditor
can assure that no class of impaired creditors votes yes on the plan.
In such an event, the plan could not be confirmed because section
1129(a)(10) will not have been satisfied. According to section 1129(a)
(10), at least one impaired class of creditors must vote yes on the
plan.®' The debtor might have tried to put the unsecured deficit claim
in a class separate from other general creditors, thereby gerrymander
ing the classes to produce at least one yes vote. But a great many
courts have prevented any such gerrymandering.'®
In In re Oaks Partners,Judge Joyce Bihary treated the un
secured deficit claim as satisfied by the surrender of comparable en
cumbered dollars. Accordingly, the secured party had no deficit
87 Flagler, 114 B.R. at 302. "What Flagler suggests is to simply cutoff [the secured party's]
rights under Section 552(b) and limit its secured claim as to the value of the Building without
accounting for [the secured party's] lien on the excess rents generated during the course of the
Chapter 11." Id.
88 In re Bloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993) (Barliant, J.); In re
Oaks Partners, Ltd., 141 B.R. at 453; In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)
(Murphy, J.).
89 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10).
90 Classification of the unsecured deficit is a bombshell in single asset cases. See generally
David Gray Carlson, The Classification Veto in Single-Asset Cases Under Bankruptcy Code
Section II29(a)(I0), 44 S.C. L. REV. 565 (1993).
91 135 B.R. 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (Bihary, J.).
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claim and therefore could not vote against the plan. The remaining
impaired creditors therefore cheerfully voted for the plan, satisfying
section 1129(a)(10).'^
This result may sound strange, but it is quite correct. If the cash
collateral had not been surrendered—if it had been accrued—^the se
cured claim of the undersecured party would have increased and the
unsecured claim would have decreased. Given enough time, the claim
would become entirely secured and would even begin to obtain an
equity cushion, thereby justifying postpetition interest under section
506(b).'^ All Judge Joyce Bihary did in Oaks Partners was to repli
cate the situation if the cash collateral had been retained instead of
paid out.®'*
One feature of the holding in Oaks Partners pertains to the treat92 Id. at 465.
92 See, e.g., Sloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. at 99-100; In re Vermont Inv. Ltd. Partner
ship, 142 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (Teel, J.); In re Seip, 116 B.R. 709, 712 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1990) (Minahan, J.).
94 Oaks Partners, 141 B.R. at 458. When sufficient cash exists to satisfy all creditors (and
even when it does not), some dominant creditors argue that impairment of minor trade credi
tors and the like is unnecessary and in bad faith. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) (plan can be
confirmed only if the plan "has been proposed in good faith"). If this argument prevails, a
court might nullify the vote of an artificially impaired class of creditors, thereby assuring that
the debtor-in-possession will run aground upon the shoals of § 1129(a)(10).
In contrast, other courts have struck down plans on grounds of bad faith artificial impair
ment. See, e.g., Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd. v. Balcor Real Estate Fin., Inc. {In re
Windsor on the River Assocs., Ltd.), 7 F.3d 127 (8th Cir. 1993) (Arnold, J.); Sandy Ridge
Dev. Corp. v. Louisiana Nat'l Bank {In re Sandy Ridge Dev. Corp.), 881 F.2d 1346, 1353 (5th
Cir. 1989) (Garwood, J.); Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd. Partnership v. Unum Life Ins. Co.
{In re Willows Convalescent Ctrs. Ltd. Partnership), 151 B.R. 220, 223 (D. Minn. 1991) (Alsop, J.); In re Lettick Typographic, Inc., 103 B.R. 32, 38-39 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1989) (Shiff, J.)
("In a transparent attempt to stage compliance with (a)(10), the debtor created an artificially
impaired class by amending its Second Plan so that [an otherwise unimpaired creditor] is to be
paid two weeks after the effective date of the Plan."); In re Meadow Glen, Ltd., 87 B.R. 421,
427 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1988) (Ayers, J.); Peter B. Meltzer, Disenfranchising the Dissenting
Creditor Through Artificial Classification or Artificial Impairment, 66 AM. BANKR. L.J. 281,
319-20 (1992) (artificial impairment should not be allowed because otherwise the veto of
§ 1129(a)(10) is trivial).
When a debtor-in-possession is solvent, it is possible to write a plan in which no class of
general creditors is impaired. Thus, in Windsor Judge Morris Sheppard Arnold ruled an ap
parently solvent debtor could not impair the small trade creditors in order to win a yes vote
from their class. Windsor, 7 F.3d at 132-33. The Windsor case therefore strongly suggests that
when the unsecured deficit disappears because postpetition collateral has accumulated, any
impairment of the remaining trade creditors is artificial, and their positive vote on the plan
cannot count.
On the other hand, the trade creditors are, by hypothesis, voting in favor of their own
impairment. As Judge Leif Clark has emphasized, if the impaired creditor is happy, why
should some other creditor be allowed to complain of impairment? In re Landing Assocs.,
Ltd., 157 B.R. 791, 814 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993); see also In re Schoeneberg, 156 B.R. 963,
968-69 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) (Monroe, J.).
On sham impairment generally, see Carlson, supra note 90, at 610.
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ment of the surplus, once the total claim of the undersecured party
had become entirely secured. Judge Bihary found that more cash col
lateral had been surrendered than was necessary to get rid of the un
secured deficit claim." The balance was an "overpayment" of the
deficit—an amount the secured party had to return. And it was to TO
returned in the form of interest foregone after the plan was confirmed.
That is, the debtor could oflFset the overpayment against its obligation
to pay the secured party interest under the plan.'®
This setoff" overlooks the fact that the overpayment constitutes
debtor equity out of which the secured party might be paid postpetition interest under section 506(b). On this view the overpayment
must also be added to the principal amount of the secured claim (the
result if postpetition interest is accrued rather than paid out), not off
set against postconfirmation cram down interest.
For example, in In re Bloomingdale Partners,^'' Judge Ronald
Barliant held that an undersecured creditor who later becomes oversecured as cash collateral accrues is entitled to the belated equity
cushion as postpetition interest.'® And in In re Vermont Investment
Ltd Partnership,^ Judge Martin Teel refused to allow the debtor to
characterize surrendered cash collateral as payment on pnncipaL
Rather, he insisted that the payments be deemed payment of postpeti95 Oaks Partners, 141 B.R. at 463.
,
96 Id ; see infra text accompanying notes 148-52 for a presentation of a mathematical
model of the setoff.
97 160 B.R. 93 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993) (Barliant, J.).
98 Id at 99-100. The procedural posture of the case was most unusual. The undersecured
creditor regretted its decision to make the § 1111(b)(2) election, ^le election me^nt that he
secured creditor would lose its unsecured deficit clam, a„d with it r r 96r967 (Bmkr
unsecured deficit against the plan. In re Bloomingdale Partners 155 B.R.
967 (Bankn
N D 111 1993) (Barliant, J.). Under a line of cases that require the unsecured deficit claim to
wi.h «h„ un,«u„d cl.in,., ..ch .n opport.ni.y
claim might guarantee the secured party the chance to veto the plan According to
ruDtcy Code § 1129(a)(10), at least one class of impaired creditors must vote yes on the plan.
If the dominant undersecured creditor can prevent this by outvoting the other
tors with its unsecured deficit claim, the undersecured creditor is m a position to veto the pla .
See generally Carlson, supra note 90, at 571-82.
,
j-c j
A
In moving for permission to undo the election with regard to a newly mo^fied
plan. Judge Barliant informed the secured creditor that the election was moot^ Over 'Jje life
the chapter 11 case, cash collateral had accumulated, so that the undersecured claim was now
Furthamor., th.
should b. u«,=d » p,^...ou .uKP
est The secured creditor tried to argue that an unsecured deficit still existed because all cash
collateral surrendered should be viewed as postpetition interest and none oi it is decreasing the
unsecured deficit. Judge Barliant refused to countenance this. In re Bloomingdale Partner^
160 B.R. at 96-97, but he did uphold a postpetition interest entitlement
deficit was fully secured and an equity cushion rendered itself apparent. Id. at 9999 142 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992).
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tion interest under section 506(b).Therefore, these two decisions
contradict the result that Judge Bihary reached in Oaks Partners.
Whereas Judge Bihary refused to honor the right of an under
secured creditor to postpetition interest, once the accumulation of
rent created an equity cushion late in the case. Judges Barliant and
Teel did the opposite. They guaranteed to the initially undersecured
creditor the right to postpetition interest once the undersecured credi
tor became oversecured.
Which approach is correct is a very close question. The follow
ing observation weighs heavily in favor of Judge Bihary's approach,
though. As cash collateral accrues and a debtor equity is created, the
excess dollars are, after all, property of the estate. It is far from clear
that the trustee has a duty to preserve the cushion. If the trustee
spends it before interest accrues, then the secured party must do with
out her postpetition interest. To be sure, the security interest of the
secured party continues to encumber postpetition proceeds.'®' Ac
cordingly, court permission or secured party consent is required. But
>00 Id. at 573. In Vermont Investment, the value of the collateral was and always remained
$19.1 million. The undersecured party's prepetition claim was as follows:
Prepetition principal
$18.8 million
Prepetition unpaid interest
$0.6 million
Total prepetition claim
$19.4 million
Unsecured deficit claim
$0.3 million
Meanwhile, postpetition rent accumulated. Of this, the debtor surrendered $1.4 million to the
undersecured party. The secured party used $200,000 to pay senior taxes. This amounted to a
§ 506(c) expense validly charged to the secured party. Therefore, about $1.2 million in surren
dered cash collateral had to be characterized as either the payment of the prepetition claim or
of postpetition interest. Id. at ill-Ti.
The secured party itself characterized the surrender as first going toward the payment of
$600,000 in prepetition interest—part of the allowed prepetition claim. Id. at 573. This was
too generous a concession. By doing so, the secured party voluntarily waived its lien and
consented to take an adequate protection payment. The undersecured party could have char
acterized only $300,000 as going toward the payment of the prepetition claim. If it had done
so, the prepetition claim would have been precisely equal to the value of the collateral. In such
a case, any future rent dollars that accumulated could be characterized as equity cushion,
against which the now-oversecured party could have had postpetition interest.
In any case, the now-oversecured party was satisfied to apply $600,000 to the prepetition
claim (the amount that corresponded to prepetition interest) and wished to establish the re
maining $600,000 as payment of postpetition interest. Judge Teel agreed;
Because the rents received by the bank provided additional collateral, the rents—
in equal amounts—both increased the bank's allowed secured claim under 11
U.S.C. § 506(b) by virtue of post-petition interest accruals and, by payment, de
creased the bank's allowed secured claim. The rent payments never exceeded postpetition interest accruals on the bank's claims. Hence the bank's allowed secured
claim plus senior tax liens continue to equal the value of the debtor's building and
there is no equity cushion for the bank's lien.
Id. at 573.
loi As Teel emphasized. Id. at 573-74.
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it is simultaneously true that the equity cushion belongs to the bank
ruptcy trustee. If the trustee obtains court permission to use cash
collateral, the trustee may be able to remove and spend the cash col
lateral before any interest accrues against it. The idea that the trustee
can use the equity cushion without preserving it for the creditor
strongly supports this approach.
On the other hand, the debtor in Oaks Partners did not spend the
cash surplus. It surrendered it to the secured party. At the time of
the confirmation hearing, the now-oversecured party enjoyed an eq
uity cushion in the building. Therefore, section 506(b) clearly applied
to the benefit of the secured party. Yet if the debtor had character
ized (or the court was willing to characterize) the transaction as fol
lows, then the secured party properly loses the right to postpetition
interest. According to this characterization, the debtor takes surplus
collateral for its own purposes free and clear of the security in
terest as soon as the cash is available. This now unencumbered cash is
used to pay down the secured claim, so that surplus cash collateral
becomes a genuine adequate protection payment. Since a debtor has
no duty to preserve an equity cushion for the benefit of future unac
crued interest, there is no reason why the transaction could not be
characterized (or recharacterized nunc pro tunc) in this fashion.'®^
C.

Surrenders of Cash Collateral with No Effect on the Size of the
Prepetition Claim
Two decisions have held that surrendered cash collateral consti-

102 If, in spite of what has just been said, a court decides that § 506(b) postpetition interest
prevents the debtor-in-possession from dissipating the belated equity cushion, a second issue
must be considered: Does interest accrue from the beginning of the bankruptcy case, or does it
start to accrue only when the equity cushion first appears? The question becomes important in
a case where net income accumulates at a rate faster than interest accrues.
If phantom interest starts to accrue at the beginning of the case (even though no equity
cushion exists against which interest might accrue), then this phantom accrued interest soaks
up all excess cash that comes into existence once the equity cushion reveals itself. If interest
accrues only when there is an equity cushion, the difference between the interest rate and the
income accrual rate belongs to the debtor.
The only case to address this issue is In re Bloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. 93 (Bankr.
N.D. 111. 1993), where Judge Barliant ruled:
Interest has been accruing on Hancock's [initially undersecured] claim since the
pendency of the case and will be allowed if and to the extent Hancock s collateral
exceeds its claim. Hancock's collateral now exceeds its claim, and given the more
than two years that have elapsed during this case, all the net rents that accrue are
fullly encumbered by Hancock's interest allowance.
Id. at 100. For this position, Barliant could quote some dictum from a Supreme Court case
which did not, incidentally, involve belated equity cushions. See Rake v. Wade, 113 S. Ct.
2187, 2191 (1993) (Thomas, J.) (§ 506(b) interest "accrues as part of the allowed claim from
the petition date until the confirmation or effective date of the plan").
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tutes a reduction of neither the undersecured creditor's total claim
nor the creditor's bifurcated secured claim. Rather, the surrenders
had no effect on the claim at all, which means that the surrenders
constituted the payment of postpetition interest to an undersecured
creditor, in violation of Timbers of Inwood Forest.
In In re Birdneck Apartment Associates, II,
a dominant
undersecured creditor sought to block confirmation because the
debtor could not confirm a plan in light of section 1129(a)(10), which
requires that at least one impaired class of creditors vote yes. As the
largest secured creditor and the largest unsecured creditor, the domi
nant undersecured creditor claimed that, since it could cause all im
paired classes to vote no, the plan could not be confirmed.'"^
The debtor pointed out that the unsecured deficit claim of the
undersecured creditor was only $300,000, yet the undersecured credi
tor had received $438,191.57 in cash collateral since the start of the
chapter 11 proceeding. According to the debtor, the undersecured
creditor was actually oversecured. As such, there was no unsecured
deficit, and the remaining unsecured creditors were free to vote yes as
a class.'®'
Judge Douglas Tice refused to go along with this reasoning. He
ruled instead that neither the secured nor the unsecured claim of the
undersecured creditor was reduced by the surrender of cash collateral.
Instead, the creditor was entitled to treat the cash collateral as inter
est payments. Judge Tice saw no impediment in Timbers to such a
result:
Debtor ignores the fact that [the undersecured creditor] has a
continuing perfected postpetition security interest in rents, and
that all revenues of the debtor constitute . . . cash collateral. The
Supreme Court's decision in [Timbers^ prohibits payments to un
dersecured creditors only from "unencumbered" assets where
there is no evidence of decline in collateral value. Debtor's argu
ment interprets Timbers too broadly and reads § 552(b) out of the
Code.'®®
103 156 B.R. 499 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1993) (Tice, J.).
104 Id. at 504. Apparently the debtor did not try to separately classify the trade creditors.
If so, and if the trade creditors voted yes on the plan, the court would have been compelled to
find that § 1129(aX10) had been met. See supra text accompanying notes 89-90.
105 Birdneck, 156 B.R. at 504-05.
106 Id, at 505. See supra text accompanying notes 69-78 for a discussion as to whether
Timbers really does bar adequate protection payments when the collateral is not depreciating
in value. Judge Tice read Vermont Investment as a case in which surrenders of cash collateral
did not reduce the principal amount of the debt. In fact, the secured party applied some of the
cash received toward postpetition interest under § 506(b), and some toward the prepetition
claim. See supra note 100.
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In fact, the debtor entirely honored the security interest in rents—it
simply thought that the rents should go to pay down the total claim of
the secured party. Judge Tice, in contrast, granted an undersecured
party postpetition interest in violation of Timbers.
A case that is apparently similar to Birdneck is DeFranco v.
Ralph D. Kaiser Co. (In re DeFranco),^'" which inexplicably held that
surrendered cash collateral does not extinguish any part of the prepetition claim. Rather, the surrenders were viewed as "compensation"
for depreciation, separate and apart from the secured claim, which
stays intact. In DeFranco, Judge Martin Teel thought that the com
pensatory nature of cash payments ruled out applying these payments
against the principal amount of an undersecured creditor's claim. As
a result, the secured creditor obtained a windfall—^the payments plus
the entire secured claim later.'"®
It is hard to tell whether DeFranco constitutes a case of surren
dered cash collateral or one of a genuine adequate protection pay
ment. In DeFranco, Judge Teel had disencumbered the income
stream from the security interest claimed by the secured creditor. As
a result, the dollars paid over at a time when they were thought to be
cash collateral were later recharacterized as unencumbered dollars.
The disencumbrance of the security interest on the cash flow came
about this way: a different, senior undersecured creditor claimed real
estate as collateral, but it stupidly forgot to encumber rents in the
mortgage agreement. A junior mortgage was completely under water
with regard to the real estate, but did have an otherwise valid security
interest on rents. Judge Teel ruled that the debtor could bifurcate the
junior mortgage into its secured and unsecured parts.'"® Since the
mortgage was entirely under water on the day of bankruptcy, the se
cured claim was zero and the unsecured claim was for the entire
prepetition amount. The debtor could then use section 506(d) to
avoid the mortgage for the unsecured portion, thereby disencum
bering the rents. This theory—quite valid in its day—is now severely
threatened by Dewsnup v. Timm,^^^ which holds that section 506(d)
cannot be used to place a cap on the secured portion of an under
secured creditor's total claim.
Yet, in spite of this lien avoidance, the secured creditor actually
obtained better treatment than it would have received if its security
interest in cash collateral had been validated. The surrender of cash
>07
>08
>09
>>0

93 B.R. 307 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1988) (Teel, J.).
Id. at 309.
Id at 308-09.
112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992) (Blackmun, J.).
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collateral ought to reduce the total claim of the secured creditor. But
in DeFranco, the total claim of the secured creditor (which was en
tirely unsecured, after the lien avoidance) was left intact."'
The theory underlying the result in DeFranco is a mystery, but
one interpretation that cannot be applied to it is that Judge Teel had
bifurcated the undersecured claim, had recognized accruing cash col
lateral as an equity cushion, and was awarding the undersecured
party postpetition interest on its secured claim under section 506(b).
Since the secured claim was deemed to be zero, postpetition interest
under section 506(b) must also be zero. Therefore, whatever the
meaning of the payment actually received by the undersecured credi
tor, it could not have been postpetition interest under section 506(b).
Neither can it be said that Judge Teel was awarding postpetition
interest as part of adequate protection—what Timbers of lnwood For
est now bars.'" Yet such interest compensation would also be based
on the value of the collateral, which in this case was zero. Therefore,
the only way to interpret the DeFranco decision is that Judge Teel
simply gave postpetition interest to a creditor that was entirely
unsecured.
A rule that characterizes surrender of cash collateral as payment
of the total claim is not entirely satisfactory, because the parties can
evade this rule by contract. Suppose that, instead of surrendering the
cash collateral that accumulates, the debtor and the secured party
agree that the debtor could use cash collateral. That is, the secured
party consents to the disencumbrance of cash collateral, but, in ex
change for this concession, the parties agree that the secured party is
entitled to some substitute collateral plus genuine interest payments
that do not affect the size of the secured party's total allowed claim
against the debtor. Timbers of Inwood Forest may prevent interest
compensation to prepetition undersecured creditors, but it does not
prevent interest compensation to undersecured postpetition lenders,
or even to entirely unsecured postpetition lenders. In Unsecured
Creditors' Committee v. Jones Truck Lines. Inc. (In re Jones Truck
111 DeFranco, 93 B.R. at 309. The numbers in DeFranco are confusing. Judge Teel refers
to the secured creditor's total claim as $300,000, which is under water. The secured creditor
received adequate protection payments of $12,000, which does not reduce the prepetition
claim. Yet the secured creditor is deemed to have an unsecured claim of only $3,659. The
collateral as to which the junior secured party is under water was the only property the debtor
still owned. It is possible that the difference between $300,000 in original prepetition claims
and the remaining $3,659 claim may reflect that the debtor had abandoned other property to
the secured party as to which it was senior. Perhaps this abandoned property was worth
$296,341.
112 See United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988).
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Lines.
the secured party and the debtor agreed to such a plan,
and the unsecured creditors objected, on the authority of Timbers of
Inwood Forest. The secured party responded that, according to the
cash collateral order, the use of cash collateral was really a postpetition loan, to which Timbers does not apply. Ruled Judge Morris
Shepard Arnold: "The court believes that the bank's view of the ar
rangement is the correct one and accepts its characterization as
reaUstic."""*
The situation, then, may be expressed as follows. If the debtor
surrenders cash collateral, any surrender ought to be considered a re
duction of principal—in this respect, Birdneck is wrongly decided.
On the other hand, if the debtor agrees to characterize the cash collat
eral as a postpetition loan to the debtor in exchange for the obligation
to pay interest, the secured party is entitled to genuine interest pay
ments, without any reduction of the secured party's total allowed
claim.
D.

Sub Rosa Avoidance of Security Interests on Income Streams

Many of the opinions previously discussed follow a theory that
recognizes the secured party's property rights to an encumbered cash
flow, but Judge Horace T. Ward, in Confederation Life Insurance Co.
V. Beau Rivage Ltd.obliterated the security interest and changed a
surrender of cash collateral into what I have been calling an adequate
protection payment.
In Beau Rivage, the secured party received what the court called
"adequate protection payments" in advance of the plan. In fact, these
payments were surrenders of cash collateral. The debtor was permit
ted to offset these adequate protection payments against the first few
payments on the debt instrument issued under cram down.''®
Although this setoff may seem to resemble those in Oaks Partners,
there is this key difference. In Oaks Partners, the surrendered cash
collateral was used to eliminate the unsecured deficit claim."' In
Beau Rivage, these same payments were used to reduce the secured
>•3 1 5 6 B . R . 608, 6 1 3 ( W . D . A r k . 1992) ( A r n o l d , J.).
Id. at 613. Arnold at least hinted that, given the consent of the secured party and the
debtor, the unsecured creditors may not even have standing to object to the cash collateral
order, but surely this applies to the bare use of the cash collateral. If the bank receives postpe
tition interest as part of adequate protection, surely the unsecured creditors have standing to
object, because the payment of interest—that is, payments that do not reduce the total allowed
claim of the secured party—must come from unencumbered assets the unsecured creditors
might otherwise get.
"5 126 B.R. 632, 640 (N.D. Ga. 1991) (Ward, J.).
116 Id.
117 See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
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claim twice over. Using the hypothetical numbers employed earlier,
Judge Ward approved a reduction of the secured claim from $88 to
$80 (by virtue of the surrender of $8 in cash collateral) and a second
reduction from $80 to $72 (by virtue of the setoff against the postconfirmation payments). In short, the secured party was double charged
by the court. Or, to say the same thing. Judge Ward essentially disen
cumbered the rent stream and treated the cash collateral surrenders as
adequate protection payments of unencumbered dollars.
Judge Ward conceded that the secured party had presented "a
sophisticated and well-reasoned argument that the bankruptcy court's
analysis resulted in a 'double credit' " for the debtor, but he felt com
pelled to reject it in deference to Timbers, which he read to mean that
no "adequate protection payments" were allowed unless the value of
the collateral was depreciating."® Because, in Beau Rivage, collateral
was increasing in value, adequate protection payments were inappro
priate. According to Judge Ward:
In Timbers, the Court was concerned that an undersecured credi
tor not improve its position with respect to other creditors. If pay
ments are made to an undersecured creditor, they must be allowed
to reduce the allowed secured claim of the creditor. Otherwise the
payments would be treated as interest payments or use value, in
direct contravention of Timbers and § 506."'
This reference to improvement of position means that Beau Rivage is
best read as a case in which the security interest on the income stream
was avoided, turning the encumbered dollars into unencumbered dol
lars, and the surrender of cash collateral into genuine adequate pro
tection payments. But avoidance is not how Judge Ward perceived
the result he reached:
While the court agrees that [the secured party] has a perfected se
curity interest in both the real property and the rents, the bank
ruptcy court was correct in its determination that the application
of the rents to the property was a transfer of value. The value
simply shifted from one form of collateral to another. There was
no depletion.""
The reference to "transfer of value" is confusing, but what Ward
seems to mean is that, while the secured party claimed real estate for
collateral, its security interest was shifted to cash, and so the cash
payment should reduce the amount of the secured claim. This over
looks the fact that the secured party was claiming both the real estate
118 Beau Rivage, 126 B.R. at 641.
119 Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
120 Id. at 641.
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and the cash. If the cash substitutes for real estate, then Judge Ward
must have disencumbered the cash in advance of the substitution.
Meanwhile, Judge Ward distinguished In re Flagler-At-First As
sociates,
which honored the security interest in the income
stream. According to Ward, Flagler depended on the presence of de
preciating collateral. But since the collateral in Beau Rivage was in
creasing in value, Flagler should not apply. Here we see Judge Ward
justifiably falling into confusion over the way Judge Cristol struggled
to express himself in Flagler. It will be recalled that, in Flagler, Cris
tol wrote of depreciation, but what he really meant was that the sur
render of the cash collateral itself eroded the secured party's
collateral.He did not mean to imply that the underlying nonliquid
collateral was depreciating.'^^
Another sub rasa avoidance of a security interest in an income
stream occurred in In re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership.^^*
In Reddington, Judge Mark McFeeley held that valuations should oc
cur on the day of the bankruptcy petition.'^' Now timing of valua
tions may seem like a benign, technical consideration, but hidden in
the timing decision are important property implications.'^® For ex
ample, in Reddington, valuation on the day of bankruptcy, followed
by strict bifurcation of the undersecured claim into its secured and
unsecured parts,implies that the undersecured creditor now owns
two quite independent claims—one secured and one unsecured. The
secured claim is defined by the value of the collateral, which in turn is
derived by the presentiation of future income. If the valuation is
final, then this bifurcation essentially disencumbers the income
stream.'^* That is to say, further accruing income does not reduce
121 114 B.R. 297 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1990) (Cristol, J.); see supra text accompanying notes 8287.
122 See supra note 84.
123 See Stein, supra note 81, at 20. For a case following Beau Rivage and disencumbering
the rent stream, see In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 547, 558-59 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 1992) (Drake, J.).
124 119 B.R. 809 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1990) (McFeeley, J.).
125 Id. at 813.
126 These implications are covered in Carlson, supra note 10, at 114-15.
127 See 11 U.S.C. § 506(a).
128 See In re Vermont Inv. Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 571, 574-75 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992)
(Teel, J.) (reading Reddington in this manner). Ironically, Judge Teel may have unwittingly
followed Reddington by accident. In the Vermont case, a secured creditor was undersecured
when the case started, and sufficient cash collateral was handed over to render the secured
party oversecured and hence, entitled to postpetition interest after a certain point. The secured
party then suggested that the surrendered cash be applied first to prepetition interest, then
other things, like real estate taxes (the accrual of which constituted a senior lien) and postpeti
tion interest. Id. at 573.
The application of cash collateral to reduce the prepetition secured claim was precisely
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the unsecured deficit. At best, the income stream further secures the
separate secured claim, creating an equity cushion and hence the right
to postpetition interest under section 506(b).
The Supreme Court's opinion in Dewsnup v.
however,
is a formidable impediment to the view that valuations on the day of
the bankruptcy petition are final. In this opinion. Justice Blackmun
ruled that section 506(d) could not be used to place a cap on the
amount of a secured portion of the undersecured claim, so that the
debtor could reserve for herself all appreciation value thereafter.'^"
The implication is that new valuations can always occur, and appre
ciation value can always be recaptured by the secured party.
Nevertheless, Dewsnup is a reading of the words in section 506(d).
Bifurcation under section 506(a) is another matter that the Court did
not directly address, though it is an aggressive judge indeed who will
uphold the finality of a bankruptcy day valuation after Dewsnup.
Therefore, it is not clear that Reddington is still viable after Dewsnup.^^^ Nevertheless, Reddington is based on the premise that an
undersecured party should not improve her position—a principle
Judge McFeeley drew from that other Supreme Court pronounce
ment—Timbers of Inwood Forest.Hence, with reference to the hy
pothetical numbers discussed previously. Judge McFeeley found that
the illiquid collateral, valued at $80, was not depreciating. During the
bankruptcy, the debtor surrendered $8 in cash collateral—^a sum that
represented pure improvement of position by the secured party. In
light of this surrender of essentially unencumbered dollars. Judge
McFeeley reduced the secured party's secured claim from $80 to $72
and the total claim from $100 to $92. The unsecured deficit claim of
$20 remained constant.
Meanwhile, Judge McFeeley, like Judge Ward, also distinguished
Flagler as a case involving depreciating collateral—a misreading of
Judge Cristol's uncrystalline opinion. Also, Judge McFeeley noted
that the court had chosen confirmation day as the time of valuation.
Such a choice of timing means that the income stream was not disen
cumbered. As McFeeley thought that petition day was the choice
what Judge McFeeley did and what Judge Teel criticized. This application constituted a disencumbrance of the cash collateral to the extent it reduced the prepetition claim.
112 S. Ct. 733 (1992) (Blackmun, J.).
130 Id. at 778.
131 Newborn, supra note 34, at 583.
132 E.g.,In re Bloomingdale Partners, 160 B.R. 93, 97 (Bankr. N.D. 111. 1993) (Barliant, J.)
(suggesting that Reddington/Sunarrow is overruled by Dewsnup).
133 See In re Reddington/Sunarrow Ltd. Partnership, 119 B.R. 809, 813 (Bankr. D.N.M.
1990).
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that Timbers dictated, he found Flagler unpersuasive.'^^
Another 5uh rosa avoidance decision is In re Continental Airlines,
Inc.,^^^ where the collateral was depreciating.'^® Judge Helen Balick
ruled that because interest income was accruing, the debtor-in-posses
sion was allowed to indulge in depreciation elsewhere, without com
pensating the secured party.Yet this interest income was cash
collateral, so that the secured party never properly received anything
in compensation for the depreciation. Or, sub rosa, Judge Balick dis
encumbered the cash collateral and then reassigned it to the secured
party as adequate protection payments.
E.

Cash Collateral Setoffs Against Cram Down Payments

Several cases have allowed the debtor to set off previously surren
dered cash collateral against the first few payments of interest due
under cram down debt instruments issued under the authority of
Bankruptcy Code section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(II). These cases resemble
negative amortization cases, in that no interest need be paid at first.
But the resemblance is misleading. A true negative amortization re
sults in the growth of the principal amount due and owing, which is
then paid back later.''® The growth occurs because unpaid interest is
added to unpaid principal.
These setoff cases are not necessarily negative amortization cases.
Sometimes the cram down interest is never allowed to accrue.
Rather, the cram down interest obligation of the debtor is simply set
off against cash collateral received by the secured party prior to con134 Id, In Reddington, the secured party moved to lift the automatic stay on the grounds
that no plan could ever be confirmed. The debtor conceded that confirmation depended upon
this disencumbrance of the income stream. Judge McFeeley seemed to emphasize "the context
of automatic stay litigation," id. at 812, but, as the issue was one of law, i.e., the state of the
security interest on cash flow, it would appear logical that McFeeley's holding is just as valid
at a confirmation hearing as it is with regard to the motion to lift the stay. See John Hancock
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Route 37 Business Park Assocs., 987 F.2d 154, 162 (3d Cir. 1993) (Alito,
J.) (holding that legal unconfirmability of a plan is per se reason to lift the stay under
§ 362(d)(2), where a creditor is undersecured).
135 134 B.R. 536, 542-43 (Bankr. D. Del. 1991) (Balick, J.).
136 The collateral was a reversionary interest in property leased to a Continental subsidiary,
for less than market rent. If the secured party had been allowed to take the premises, it could
have expelled the tenant and rerented the space at a higher market rate. While the lease en
dured, the secured party suffered a loss for which it should have been compensated. Id at 54344.
137 Id. at 544.
138 On the permissibility of negative amortization as a cram down technique, see In re Club
Assocs., 107 B.R. 385, 398-400 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (Murphy, J.), aj^Td, 956 F.2d 1065
(11th Cir. 1992); Barry S. Schermer & Keith W. Bartz, Negative Amortization and Plan Confir
mation: Is It Fair and Equitable Under Section 1129(b) of the Bankruptcy Code?, 8 BANKR.
DEV. J. 1 (1991).
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firmation. That is, interest on the cram down note disappears and
does not augment the principal amount due under the cram down
note.
To illustrate the diflFerence between setoffs that are false negative
amortization plans and genuine negative amortization, it will be use
ful to demonstrate a nonamortization cram down, against which the
various setoff plans might be compared.
Assume an undersecured creditor claims $100 in total, against
only $80 of collateral. The unemcumbered asset earns $8 a year, and
the secured party's lien encumbers this income. For three years, such
income ($24) has been surrendered to the secured party. These sur
renders have reduced the total claim to $76, while the underlying col
lateral remains at $80.'" The secured party, once undersecured, has
become oversecured. This is shown in Figure Five.

Equity Cushion

Secured Oaim

Bankraptcy Petition

Time

Plan Confirmed

FIGURE 5: SURRENDERED CASH COLLATERAL

Under section 1129(b)(2)(A)(i), a debtor-in-possession might ac
ceptably cram down a secured party's secured claim of $76 by issuing
the secured party a note payable in five years, with the market rate of
interest (say, 10%) due at the end of every year. By definition, such a
debt instrument has a present value of $76 (rounded off), but more
formally;
139 Recall that the value of collateral is simply the present value of income going forward; if
no depreciation has occurred, the income-producing collateral remains at $80 in perpetuity.

1994]

ADEQUATE PROTECTION PA YMENTS

1395

rA
~ ( 1 + r y •*" . ? ! ( 1 + r ) '
pv =

PV =

(i.iy

+
"

i
tf,

$47.19

+ 28.805 = $75,995

(i.iy

FIGURE SIX: GENERIC CRAM DOWN
In this formula, A = $76, the principal amount of the secured
claim, r = the market rate of interest (0.1), t = the year in which
payment is due,*'^' and n = the number of years before the principal
is due (5). The first ratio represents the present value of $76 to be
received five years hence and the second ratio represents the present
value of an income stream of $7.60 per year for five years.
Even this plan can be criticized because it implicitly eliminates
the secured party's right to postpetition interest.
Recall that the
collateral was worth $80 and the secured claim had fallen to $76 (af
ter the total claim of $100 had been reduced by $24 to account for the
surrenders of cash collateral). If the cash collateral had never been
surrendered and had instead been allowed to accrue, then the secured
creditor, initially under water, would have developed an equity cush
ion in the third year of the proceeding. This is shown in Figure
Seven.
i-f The collateral is worth $80, but the remaining prepetition claim is only $76, because $24
of cash collateral has reduced the prepetition claim of $100. Therefore, the secured claim is
only $76.
.
, r.
r
Payment on principal is due in five years, so that, in the first ratio, /=5. Payment oi
interest is due at the end of five years in the second ratio, so that t has a range of one to five.
142 On the other hand, the debtor has had the benefit of $24 in early distributions which
could profitably be reinvested. This reinvestment income might properly count in mitigation
of any fault in the cram down provisions of the plan.
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$104
$100
$92
$80

$100
$80

Original Collateral

Bankraptcy Petition

Time

Han Confirmed

FIGURE SEVEN: CASH COLLATERAL ACCRUED

Nothing in section 506(b) conditions postpetition interest on the exist
ence of an equity cushion at the commencement of the case}'^^ Never
theless, surplus cash belongs to the bankrupt estate and can be used
(with court permission)*'*^ for the benefit of the estate. One use of
these funds is to make adequate protection payments—including the
adequate protection of the very creditor that used to own the cash
collateral. If a court is willing to characterize the payment of surplus
cash in this way, then the secured creditor has no right to postpetition
interest.*'*'
The plan just presented resembles one that Judge Margaret Mur
phy confirmed in In re Club Associates}^ Judge Murphy also ruled
that the principal amount of the secured claim should be $76—not
$80. This amounted to a denial of postpetition interest under section
506(b). Judge Murphy justified this reduced amount on the ground
that "[i]f a creditor's claim is not oversecured . . . accrual of interest
stops on the date the petition is filed."*'*' This limitation on section
506(b) is not expressly stated in that provision, but can nevertheless
be supported by the observation that a trustee has no obligation to
maintain a cash surplus for the benefit of a secured party's unaccrued
interest. This is not to say that the trustee may invade the collateral
needed to secure the creditor's claim. But the pure surplus is property
of the estate and should, under court supervision, be available to the
trustee.
The debtor in In re Oaks Partners, Ltd.,*'*® proposed something
143 See In re Vermont Inv. Ltd. Partnership, 142 B.R. 571 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1992) (Teel, J.);
In re Seip, 116 B.R. 709, 712 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1990) (Minahan, J.).
See 11 U.S.C. § 363(c)(2).
145 See supra text accompanying notes 91-102.
•46 107 B.R. 385 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989) (Murphy, J.).
147 Id. at 391 n.6.
148 141 B.R. 453 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (Bihary, J.).
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diflFerent from just a write-down of the secured claim that occurred in
Club Associates. The Oaks Partners debtor wanted the secured party's
total claim to be reduced to $80 by application of $20 of the cash
collateral to the total debt. It then wanted the secured party to return
the "overpayment" of $4."^' The debtor's plan did not require the
secured party to transfer cash. Instead, the extra $4 would be paid by
setoff of interest due under the debt instruments issued to the secured
party under cram down."°
The cram down rights issued to the secured party therefore can
be expressed as follows:
1^' Id. at 457. This return may have violated the secured party's right to postpetition inter
est under § 506(b). In addition, the secured party was a wraparound mortgagee, meaning that
it was surety for a senior mortgagee. To the extent senior interest (if left unpaid) swelled the
size of a senior encumbrance on the collateral, the secured party was entitled to adequate
protection—that is, compensation in the form of unencumbered dollars for the amount of
senior interest actually paid. Senior accruing interest is routinely held to be one of the things
against which a junior mortgagee is entitled to be protected. See Carlson, supra
at 65053; see also Ridgemont Apartment Assocs., Ltd. v. Atlanta English Village, Ltd., 110 B.R. 77,
82-83 (N.D. Ga.) (Vining, J.), aff'd mem., 890 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir. 1989).
Judge Bihary ruled against the secured party on this last point because the senior mortga
gee was nonrecourse. See also In re Club Assocs., 107 B.R. 385, 396 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1989)
(Murphy, J.), afd, 956 F.2d 1065 (11th Cir. 1992). Lack of recourse, however, is irrelevant if
senior interest would nevertheless accrue if left unpaid. In fact, the wraparound junior mort
gagee should be considered subrogated to the senior mortgagee. The junior mortgagee there
fore remains entitled to protection from itself as subrogee to an encroaching senior mortgap.
Stephen A. Weiss, Note, Suretyship as Adequate Protection in Bankruptcy: The Status of Un
dersecured Third Party Guaranties Under Section 361 of the Bankruptcy Code, 12 Cardozo L.
Rev. 285 (1990).
^
^
x o-, n i,
150 cf. Fairfax Sav, v. Sherwood Square Assocs. {In re Sherwood Square As^s.), 87 a.K.
388, 394 (Bankr. D. Md. 1988) (Derby, J.). In Sherwood Square, the debtor paid postpetition
interest to an undersecured party as part of adequate protection. Before confirmation, the
Supreme Court, in United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365
(1988) (Scalia, J.), ruled that postpetition interest was not part of adequate protection. Judge
Stephen Derby effectively applied Timbers retroactively and ordered the return of th^ pay
ments. Sherwood Square, 87 B.R. at 394. But the return was to be in the foim of offsets
against obligations to pay the secured party under the plan. This transformed the plan into
one entailing false negative amortization. And, like in Oaks Partners, the secured party was
entitled to return what it owed over time, without having to pay interest—a fiscal advantage to
the secured party. Id.

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

1398
PV

PV
PV =

A
(1 + r)'

rA - C
1 + r

80

4

$49.60 +

3.636

[Vol. 15:1357

rA
.»2 (1 + r)'
'

8

+ 23.048 = $76,284

FIGURE EIGHT: THE CRAM DOWN IN
OAKS PARTNERS
Here, yi = $80,''' r = 0.1, C = the total cash collateral surrendered
between the bankruptcy petition and confirmation of the plan, n = 5,
and t = the year in which a payment is to be made. The first ratio is
the present value of $80 to be received in five years, the second ratio is
the present value of $4 of interest due at the end of the first year, and
the third ratio is the present value of $8 a year starting in the second
year and running through the fifth year.
Like Club Associates, the Oaks Partners decision denied the se
cured party postpetition interest, when $4 of equity cushion was cre
ated by the surrender of cash collateral beyond the amount of the
unsecured deficit. If the secured party had been awarded postpetition
interest, the debtor would have been entitled to $80 (the amount of
the secured claim). As evidenced by these numbers, the secured party
received only $76,284."^
Another case in which a setoff was approved in principle is In re
A stands for both the remaining amounts due on the prepetition claim and the value of
the collateral. In essence, the debtor paid down the total claim until the unsecured deficit was
satisfied and only the secured claim remained. The undersecured creditor had been rendered
into an oversecured creditor—through the surrender of cash collateral.
•52 This represents the principle in Oaks Partners, but perhaps not the result. In Oaks Part
ners, the collateral was valued at about $12 million, and cash collateral surrendered exceeded
$3.1 million. Of this latter figure, the secured party was able to retain $2,975 million of the
cash collateral it received, and it had to return $180,000, in the form of a setoff against the first
year's interest due under the cram down debt. The court noted that the secured party's total
prepetition claim was $14.3 million, but the present value of the cram down debt was over $15
million. In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., 135 B.R. 440, 447 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1991) (Bihary, J.).
Therefore, it would appear that the secured party received enough actual value to cover
$180,000 worth of postpetition interest that had accrued against the equity cushion prior to
confirmation.
In a later opinion. Judge Bihary ultimately refused to confirm the plan because of some
concerns about an unrelated amount of true negative amortization. In re Oaks Partners, Ltd.,
141 B.R. 453 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992), but, after some amendments to the plan, she finally
relented and signed a confirmation order. In re Oaks Partners, Ltd., No. 89-00948, 1992
Bankr. LEXIS 784 (Mar. 6, 1992).
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Montgomery Court Apartments of Ingham County, Ltd.
In this
case, the debtor had surrendered $8 of cash collateral, so the remain
ing total claim was $92 and the collateral remained at $80. The
debtor then proposed to set the entire $8 oflF against cram down obli
gations, but, in compensation, also proposed to raise the secured
claim from $80 to $88, thereby establishing the status quo as if the
cash collateral had never been surrendered and had been allowed to
accrue."'* The present value of the cram down instrument in Mont
gomery Court was as follows:
PV =

A + C

!

-I

(1 -h r)' ^

PV

88
(1.1)'

1
^

rA — C
1 + r

.80
(1.1)

1-

2

A

rA

^

t-2

(1 + r)'

1^

2
.-2

(1.1)'

8.80

PV = $54.56 -I- 0.7272 -H 25.3528 = $80.64
FIGURE NINE: THE CRAM DOWN IN
MONTGOMERY COURT
The first ratio is the present value of $88 to be received in five
years. The second ratio is the present value of $0.80 of interest due at
the end of the first year (that is, $8.80 in cram down interest minus
the $8 setoff), and the third ratio is the present value of $8.80 a year
starting two years hence and running through the fifth year.
The cram down rules require that the debtor receive a present
value of $80 (the value of the collateral that existed at the time of
confirmation). As can be seen, on these numbers the secured party
gets over $80."'
Although this plan is described as a give-back of cash collateral,
it is actually a true negative amortization plan. The negative amorti
zation ($8) equated with the amount of cash collateral received, but
this was pure coincidence. In negative amortization plans, other
amounts could have been chosen, if the concept is to be allowed at
all."® No principle connects the amount of negative amortization
•53 141 B.R. 324 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1992) (Sellers, J.).
•54 Id. at 339.
•55 Once again, this figure represents the value of distributions under the plan. The secured
creditor has also recieved the investment income from the early distribution of the $8 in cash
collateral. See supra note 142.
•56 In Montgomery Court, the secured party claimed that it could not be forced to forego
cram down interest because the cash collateral had been received as part of its adequate protec-
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with the amount of cash collateral surrendered above the amount of
the unsecured deficit claim.
Though she found other reasons to reject the plan,*'' Judge Sell
ers, in Montgomery Court, seemed to approve of this negative amorti
zation plan in principle:
Although [the secured party] appeared to object to such addi
tion, that treatment is favorable to it. Therefore, the Court believes
that the objection is more properly to the application of the
amount added to satisfy the initial payments required under the
Plan rather than to the addition to the allowed secured claim.
Such addition is permissible, although it may not be the only ap
propriate treatment of such postpetition payments.
In conclusion, the Court finds permissible [the debtor's] pro
posals to . . . add to the appraised value for rents paid to [the se
cured party] postpetition.
Thus, Montgomery Court appears to be a rare case in which negative
amortization might have worked.
To summarize, in Club Associates, the secured claim was written
down to $76 by the amount of cash collateral surrendered. This pro
duced a secured claim that was less than the value of the collateral.
Yet no provision was made for the accrual of postpetition interest. In
Oaks Partners, the secured claim was also written down to $76. The
$4 in surrendered cash collateral beyond the $20 unsecured deficit
was treated as a mistake that had to be corrected. The secured party,
however, was permitted to return the mistaken payments in the form
of an offset against postconfirmation cram down interest. Because the
secured party was not required to return the overpayment immedi
ately, the secured party in Oaks Partners made out slightly better
($76,284) than the secured party in Club Associates (who obtained
only $76). Both cases essentially denied to their respective secured
parties their rights to receive postpetition interest under section
506(b) out of an equity cushion. In Montgomery Court, however, the
secured party forfeited nothing. The amount of cash collateral re
ceived became the measure of negative amortization, but this measure
was pure coincidence.
tion. Judge Sellers disagreed, stating that the collateral had not declined in value and therefore
the payments could not be viewed as compensating for depreciation. Montgomery Court, 141
B.R. at 340. A better response would have been that the equation of negative amortization
with cash collateral payments is purely coincidence, so that characterization of those payments
is irrelevant.
157 Judge Sellers found that the plan violated the absolute priority rule, because the old
owners' new capital was insufficient to trigger the new value exception. Id. at 345-46.
158 Id. at 339.
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A different sort of setoff case is In re IPC Atlanta Ltd. Partner
ship.Retreating once again to the artificial numbers employed pre
viously, the secured party in IPC had received $8 of cash collateral,
and the collateral was valued at $80. Judge Homer Drake ruled that
the cash collateral surrendered could be credited against the first few
cram down obligations of the debtor,^®" so that we had this situation:
PV =

A
(1 -I- r)'

rA - C . V
^ + A
(1 -b r)
t=2 (1 -I- r)'

80
0
4
77-77^ +
—TT—
+ t=2
A
^
1.1

PV

(l.iyo

PV =

$49.60

-h

0

8
(1.1)'

-I- 23.048 = $72,648

FIGURE TEN: THE CRAM DOWN IN IPC
ATLANTA
In IPC, the secured party should have received $80 (the value of the
collateral), but received only $72,648. This occurred because the set
off wiped out the first year of cram down interest. Now if Judge
Drake had simply declared the security interest on the income stream
to be void, then the $8 the secured party received would be an ade
quate protection payment that would reduce the secured claim to $72
(and the total claim to $92). By allowing the setoff, however, the de
duction of the $8 was taken out of cram down interest—a form of
recoupment that was slightly more financially advantageous for the
secured party. Nevertheless, it is fair to read the IPC decision as one
in which the income stream was disencumbered from the secured
party's lien—a decision, incidentally, in line with the governing appel
late opinion in the Northern District of Georgia,'®' but one that can
not be reconciled very well with Dewsnup v. Timm.
CONCLUSION
By way of concluding, I have tried to illustrate a few mutually
exclusive ideas which should be kept as separate as possible when it
becomes necessary to determine the meaning of adequate protection
payments or a surrender of cash collateral.
159 142 B.R. 547, 555-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1992) (Drake, J.).
>60 Id. at 559.
Ridgemont Apartment Assocs., Ltd. v. Atlanta English Village, Ltd., 110 B.R. 77, 82-83
(N.D. Ga.) (Vining, J.), aff'd mem., 890 F.2d 1166 (11th Cir. 1989).
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First, the phrase "adequate protection payment" should signify
the transfer of previously unencumbered assets from the debtor to the
creditor in satisfaction of debt. The surrender of cash collateral may
be a payment, in the sense of extinguishing antecedent debt, but cash
collateral is different from the adequate protection payments, because
the secured party already owns the cash collateral. Surrender of cash
collateral is more precisely analyzed as the abandonment of overencumbered property—something the trustee should do whenever
overencumbered collateral is not necessary for an eflFective reorganiza
tion.'®^ The only diflFerence between surrendering an encumbered dol
lar and an encumbered piece of equipment is that the former, being
already liquid, need not be liquidated in a sale. The latter must be
sold pursuant to the rules of the Uniform Commercial Code.
Second, "payment," in the strict sense of the word, reduces the
debtor's estate, but surrender of cash collateral does not, as cash col
lateral has already been transferred to the secured creditor. This dis
tinction implies that genuine payment can constitute a mode of
adequate protection of the secured party, but surrender of cash collat
eral can never constitute adequate protection. If the two are con
founded, then the security interest on the cash collateral is effectively
avoided. If cash collateral is changed into an "adequate protection
payment," the secured party has effectively forfeited its security inter
est. Or, to say the same thing in different words, the secured creditor
is made to pay for her own adequate protection—precisely what the
Bankruptcy Code guards against.
These are hard distinctions indeed to keep straight, yet attending
to their integrity would increase the clarity of analysis in one of the
most difficult areas in bankruptcy (or any other) law—the meaning
and application of adequate protection payments and surrender of
cash collateral.
These are the words of 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2), which articulate the policy of abandon
ment in bankruptcy. Abandonment per se is governed by 11 U.S.C. § 554.

